

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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A New Policy for American Psychological Warfare

BY OLEG ANISIMOV

THE twentieth century has witnessed not only an immense increase in the number of those who actively participate in politics but also a growing independence of the political behavior of millions of people from established concepts of loyalty. Especially since World War I, increasing numbers of people have displayed a disposition to give support to their government or to withhold it in accordance with their personal attitude to some great over-all political issue (freedom, durable peace, social justice), rather than adhere to the principle of unqualified loyalty to their government.

The attitude in itself is not new. What is new is its vital relevance to international politics and military affairs. The importance of this "revolt of the masses" is illustrated by the revolutions against colonialism which swept Asia and Africa and changed the balance of international power; by the mass surrenders of Red Army soldiers to the Germans in the early stages of World War II, when the vague hope that the Germans were bringing to Russia a "better political system" than Communism caused hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers to surrender without fighting and millions of civilians to cooperate readily with the occupation authorities; by statements made by the leaders of the powerful French and Italian Communist parties to the effect that if their respective countries became engaged in a war with the Soviet Union the Communists would not fight against the "fatherland of the workers"; and by the refusal of large numbers of Chinese prisoners of war in Korea to return home.

This independence of the "political psychology" of large numbers of people from a strictly "national" sense of loyalty has made high-level diplomacy an inadequate means of political action and has created an effective supplement to diplomacy in the form of psychological warfare, which represents a direct appeal to the people. With reference to the cold war, the attitude of the mass of people in various countries to the dramatic tug-of-war between the Communist and non-Communist camps vitally affects the real power of these two camps; and power determines the bargaining position of the diplomat.

The Soviet Union was the first country to realize the new potentialities offered to diplomacy by the fact that, as John Foster Dulles recently put it, "divisions of land and water, of desert and mountain range, of river and plain have lost much of their significance."¹ Soviet rulers evolved an elaborate concept of psychological warfare and put it to the test of practice on a very large scale. Soviet diplomats and psychological warfare strategists never work at cross purposes. Their activities always supplement each other. While, for example, Soviet diplomats protest at the French and British foreign offices against the Paris agreements, Communist psychological warfare strategists organize in Britain, France, and Western Germany mass demonstrations and meetings of protest against German rearmament with the view of putting additional "psychological" pressure on Paris, London, and Bonn. This tactic does not guarantee success, but nobody can deny its effectiveness.

By contrast, American policy makers appear to plan their psychological offensives behind the Iron Curtain in isolation from American diplomatic moves; sometimes it even appears that American diplomacy seeks to achieve goals which are diametrically opposed to those sought by American psychological warfare strategists. Thus, for example, President Eisenhower, in his address to the United Nations in which he proposed the creation of an international atomic energy pool, emphasized that we "never have, never will propose or suggest that the Soviet Union relinquish what is rightfully theirs."² This statement was designed to assure Soviet rulers that although the United States does not agree to the seizure of the satellites by Russia, Americans recognize that the Soviet government has a legal title to the territory of Russia proper.

Six weeks earlier, in a letter to the newly appointed director of the United States Information Agency, Mr. Theodore Streibert, the President defined the task of the new agency (which was to control all American psychological warfare activities) as one of convincing nations that "the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with, and will advance [the] legitimate aspirations [of the peoples of the world] for freedom, progress and peace."³ Since the Soviet régime came to power through a coup, never held a free election, and has refused to cooperate in insuring peace, the United States Information Agency in its broadcasts directed behind the

¹*The New York Times*, April 12, 1955.

²President Eisenhower's speech before the United Nations, December 8, 1953.

³*The New York Times*, October 28, 1953.

Iron Curtain has stuck to the line (evolved after the start of the cold war) that the rulers of the Soviet Union are usurpers, that they have no rightful claim to govern Russia, that nothing short of a complete change of régime could advance the aspirations of the Soviet man for freedom, progress, and peace. To Soviet people, the policy announced at the U.N. and the one adhered to by the Information Agency must appear to be diametrically opposite. This is confirmed by the reaction of nearly all Soviet defectors.

The discrepancy between the efforts of American diplomacy and those of American psychological warfare has a more serious negative effect behind the Iron Curtain than is generally realized. The overtures of the American diplomats to the rulers of the Soviet Union sound unconvincing when made against the background of the militant assertions of the United States Information Agency; the latter's claims that the United States pursues a policy which promotes other peoples' "legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace" have a false ring when matched against the proclaimed readiness of the American diplomats to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union at the price of sacrificing these aspirations.

This self-defeating situation, which undermines confidence in the good faith of the United States, can be changed only if the United States either subordinates realities to principles and embarks upon an aggressive policy aimed at the destruction of the Soviet régime regardless of the cost of such a policy to the American people, or if Washington subordinates its psychological warfare activities to the realistic objectives sought by the diplomats and stops taking its stand upon principles which the United States is not prepared to back by deeds. Since the first course can hardly be expected to be adopted, not only because of the overwhelming opposition to it among America's allies but also because it would probably lead to a world war which no American wants,⁴ the second course appears as the only practical alternative to the present policy which sets the diplomat against the psychological warfare strategist, to the detriment of both. This alternative means winning Soviet people to the support of American foreign policy instead of seeking to "sell" them certain abstract principles of American political philosophy or certain aspects of the American way of life. The task is neither easy nor simple. But unless it is undertaken, American psychological

⁴The possibility of a spontaneous revolution succeeding in Russia against the formidable might of the present Soviet leadership is remote, without active American help given to the revolutionaries. This, in all probability, would lead to war.

warfare activities will remain what they are now, a source of frequent embarrassment to the American diplomats and a cause of disenchantment with the United States to most of those behind the Iron Curtain, who, at a considerable risk, occasionally tune in on American broadcasts, only to discover that the United States has no meaningful message for them.

Questions that arise in this connection are: "Is there any point in seeking to win widespread support in the Soviet Union for the objectives of United States foreign policy? Assuming that this could be achieved, could the pressure of public opinion influence the policies of the rulers of the Soviet Union?" The answer is "yes." There does not exist in the Soviet Union anything like a free public opinion, but there do exist certain widespread attitudes to the big problems which vitally affect (or are likely to affect) the fortunes of Soviet people. A defeatist attitude due to the conviction that "any change will be for the better" was one example of such a mass attitude around 1941. By 1945 this mood had largely given way to the optimistic belief that the end of the war would mean "big changes" from above, a liberalization of the régime by governmental decree. The expectation that something was going to happen, which seems to have been widespread at Stalin's death, was another example of such mass emotions. These widespread attitudes to certain vital issues appear to be rationalizations or rather crystallizations of the frustrations caused by the Soviet way of life. The problem for the American psychological warfare strategist is to harness one—or several—of these tidal waves of mass emotion and direct it into channels favorable to the goals of the American diplomat.

Soviet rulers have given many proofs of their being not only well informed about the genuine feelings of their people but also of taking these feelings into account. After the early defeats suffered in World War II, the Soviet government discarded its ineffective internationalist propaganda nearly overnight and appealed to the patriotic feelings of Soviet people, even though this went against the essence of the Communist doctrine. The new propaganda line, which aroused a widespread response, was a convincing demonstration of the ability of the Soviet government to adjust its policies to popular sentiments when this is necessary. The abandonment of the "Stalinist line" immediately after the dictator's death was another proof that, all propaganda to the contrary, Soviet rulers were well aware how unpopular Stalin had been with the majority of

Soviet people and that they were ready to adjust their policy to "politico-psychological" requirements.

This is not to say that Soviet rulers are guided in their policies by the desires of the peoples whom they rule. Far from it. But popular sentiment is a factor that figures prominently in the political calculations of Soviet rulers. If this were not the case, the Soviet government would not devote so much attention to propaganda.

It is of course impossible to assert that the American government would achieve really satisfactory results in their dealings with the Soviet Union if an important segment of the Soviet population could be convinced that the objectives of United States foreign policy serve the genuine interests of Soviet people. What is asserted here is merely that American diplomacy would be more likely to be successful if its moves were helped by American psychological warfare efforts instead of being hampered by them as is often now the case. The irrelevance of American psychological warfare to the realities of the international situation and to American foreign policies has a particularly suspicious ring to the Soviet people because they remember that the Nazis used high-sounding principles as a camouflage for their intention to subjugate and dismember Russia. The excessive emphasis placed by many leading political figures in the United States upon the military character of the East-West conflict gives a sharp edge to the average Soviet man's uneasy suspicions about American political intentions with respect to Russia. As a result, under conditions of present international tension, American psychological warfare tactics tend to rally Soviet people behind their government rather than drive a wedge between Soviet people and their government. Soviet rulers appear to find it to their advantage to perpetuate international tension rather than reduce it, even though they seem to be afraid of a head-on clash with the United States. This situation could be changed only if the United States adopted a policy that would weaken the "politico-psychological" hold of the Soviet government over its people rather than strengthening it, as the case appears to be now. A brief outline of strategy is offered below for such a new American policy.

Such a policy has to take into account both the rulers and the mass of people in the Soviet Union. So far as the rulers are concerned we must keep in mind two fundamental considerations:

- 1) People tend to change their opinions when they are frustrated. In spite of many setbacks, the rulers of the Soviet Union have been

very successful in their foreign policy. There is no evidence that they can be *cajoled* into cooperation with the West; yet there is a possibility that they could be *forced* into such cooperation by serious frustrations. Fear of war, of popular resistance, and fear of a deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations appear to be the three main concerns of the Soviet leadership. None of these fears *alone* has so far induced Soviet leaders to revise radically their foreign policies and seek genuine cooperation with the West. But the effort has never been made to bring the *combined* weight of these fears to bear upon the Soviet rulers. Such an attempt could be successful.

2) Soviet rulers cannot be expected to renounce their present policy of non-cooperation with the West unless an acceptable alternative is offered. It is, for example, futile to expect that Soviet rulers would agree to the holding in Russia of free elections, because the violence of political emotions in the Soviet Union would leave the present rulers little chance of surviving a revolutionary political change.

As far as Soviet people (as distinguished from their rulers) are concerned, the main requirements of a successful American psychological offensive within the framework of attainable objectives of their diplomacy appear as follows:

1) The objectives pursued by American psychological warfare strategists must exercise a strong emotional appeal to Soviet people. Only big, momentous issues have such an appeal. The Soviet Union is not a country of fine shades and subtle intellectual speculations. The average Soviet man sees "politics" only in very general outline: happiness and justice for all, brotherhood of nations, durable peace; or oppression, misery, war, maybe total annihilation. After two years spent in Communist captivity, General Dean came to the conclusion that to win over the ordinary Communist in Asia, "We must have an answer simple enough for the dumbest to understand."⁵ This is true not only of Asiatic Communists but to a very large extent of all those who grow up under totalitarian conditions.

Durable peace could be made such a central issue, around which the United States would build its psychological offensive. For nearly ten years, Soviet propaganda has driven home to Soviet (and other) people the idea that on the most important issue of this

⁵*General Dean's Story*, as told to William L. Worden by Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, 1954, p. 294.

age—the problem of man's survival—the Soviet Union is on the side of peace lovers and the United States is the head of the warmongers. If the United States undertook a campaign of *equal duration and intensity*, designed to convince the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that it is the American-led camp which champions the adherence of all nations to a foolproof system of collective security and that the Soviet peace plan is merely a trap, the results achieved by such a campaign behind the Iron Curtain might be very impressive. The Baruch Plan or some modified version thereof, acceptable to America's allies, could be made the basis of such a campaign. It would have to be initiated with great fanfare and kept up for many years.

2) Such a campaign could be tied in with the theses: a) that the rulers of the Soviet Union are unwilling to agree to the establishment of a sound system of collective security guaranteed by international control because they are reluctant to admit the existence of vast concentration camps throughout the Soviet Union; and b) that if the Soviet Union joined in an effective system of collective security, Soviet rulers would no longer have the advantage of diverting a large share of the national income to armaments and would not be in a position to resist popular pressure for a liberalization of the régime.

3) In politics, abstractions are meaningless unless they serve a practical purpose. The successes of Soviet propaganda are largely due to the fact that it is tied to action and conducted in a manner that gives people a sense of participation in the great events of this age. The Communist peace campaign is tied to the collection of signatures under various "Appeals" ("Stockholm Appeal," "Vienna Appeal"). Every possible means should be used to give the man behind the Iron Curtain a sense of participation in the American sponsored international peace campaign.

4) Simplicity, consistency and repetition are basic requirements for effective psychological warfare. The psychologically effective substance of Soviet peace campaigns is usually expressed in no more than twenty words, often less. The gist of the "Stockholm Appeal" was: "Ban the A-bomb!" The "Vienna Appeal" added to this: "Refuse to fight for your government if it unleashes a world war!" American propaganda tries to counter this either by denunciations of Communism or by sporadic information about disarmament discussions going on in the U.N. But these negotiations are so involved that even a citizen of the free world no longer knows what is really happening. The West seems to have lost its former knack for evolving

big political concepts and hammering out really meaningful slogans capable of electrifying millions of people the world over: "the war to end wars," "open diplomacy," "a world made safe for democracy," "assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." Past failures may be the reason why Western statesmen are wary today about sweeping phrases. But the scope of the problems that this generation faces require broad political concepts.

5) In evolving psychological warfare tactics it is necessary to take into account the existence in the Soviet Union of a widespread inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West, and of its usual concomitant—the need for "over-compensation." The slogan that "peace can be won only if the great, generous Soviet people will help all peaceful nations secure it" is likely to be far more appealing to the Soviet man than propaganda that stresses the advantages of Democracy over Communism or describes the high living standards enjoyed under a free economy.

6) In the course of her history, Russia more than once was the victim of invasions from Asia. There are indications that many Russians tend to feel concern over the prospect of China becoming a great industrial power armed with A- and H-bombs. The thesis that unless the Soviet government agrees to join in a foolproof system of international security with the West, Russia may find herself someday friendless in the face of a threat stemming from growing Chinese nationalism is likely to catch the ear of many Russians. (Especially since the idea of expanding into the thinly populated areas of Soviet Central Asia must be naturally tempting to overpopulated China.)

7) Oddly enough, Russian people appear to be sensitive to both fairness and considerations of power. To be effective, American psychological warfare behind the Iron Curtain must, at one and the same time, be the expression of official American views and yet not appear as an exclusively American action. For if American psychological warfare is not known to represent official policies of the United States, it will be regarded as an empty "war of words," as mere propaganda. But if American psychological warfare is advertised as an exclusively American undertaking, and not as the expression of the aspirations and opinions of *all* men of goodwill, this is likely to intensify the Soviet man's inferiority complex and clash with his sense of fairness; for why should not *all* men of goodwill back American policies if these policies are fair?

The psychological warfare strategy outlined above would make sense only if it were conducted as an integral part of a broad diplomatic offensive. To the diplomat would fall the task of turning the intangible results achieved through psychological warfare into concrete international agreements; to him would also fall the task of driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and China, and, more generally, the task of causing as many frustrations to Soviet rulers as possible.

There is, of course, no guarantee of success for the strategy and tactics outlined in this article. Nor is it asserted that the plan sketched here is the only one or necessarily the best. But there can hardly be any doubt that American foreign policy could achieve better results than it does at present, if American policymakers use all the means at their disposal in a concentrated and coordinated manner and in doing so take into account the "political psychology" of Soviet people, both rulers and masses.

Reminiscences of the February Revolution

The April Crisis*

BY IRAKLI TSERETELLI

II

REVOLUTIONARY Petrograd watched the proceedings in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet with keen interest. Invisible threads seemed to link every seething section of the capital with the Tavrichesky Palace. Rumors of a rift between the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee over the issue of war aims swiftly spread through the lobbies of the Tavrichesky and soon reached the workers' suburbs and the soldiers' barracks. Nothing more than these rumors was needed to arouse the masses.

In the morning hours of April 20 crowds of workers from outlying suburbs began converging toward the center of the city. The Finlandsky regiment in full battle array surrounded the Mariinsky Palace, residence of the government.

Demonstrators moved along, carrying red flags and banners with the slogans: "Down with Miliukov!" "Down with Guchkov!" "Down with a policy of conquest!" A few banners bore the slogan: "Down with the Provisional Government!" Throngs of workers and soldiers kept pouring into the streets, firmly convinced that they had been called out by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee immediately dispatched delegates to address the Finlandsky regiment and the demonstrating crowds; they were to make it clear that no such call had been issued and that, on the contrary, the Executive Committee requested the people to stop the demonstrations, which might lead to bloodshed, and to await calmly the decisions of the leading organs of the Revolution.

The crowds obeyed and dispersed. The Finlandsky regiment went back to its barracks. Yet the general excitement did not abate and

*This is the second excerpt, translated into English, from Chapter 10 of the author's unpublished reminiscences. The material is copyrighted by the author [Ed.].

new processions spontaneously sprang up here and there. Soon supporters of the government started their own counter-demonstrations. Agitators from this group ascribed the initiative of the movement to the Bolsheviks, in particular to Lenin, although they must have been aware that the latter had as yet no influence whatever with the masses and was so hated by the soldiers that he had been compelled to appeal to the Executive Committee for protection against violence. Some of the soldiers even joined the counter-demonstrations, formed of right-wing citizens, university students, and intelligentsia, displaying banners with the slogan: "Down with Lenin!"

Within the Executive Committee, meanwhile, the tension was mounting. Tempers rose high when it became known that the commander of the Petrograd military district, General Kornilov, had ordered the units under his command to take position with the artillery in the Palace Square. Some of the troops had obeyed and were already posted in the Square, while others refused to come out and had notified the Executive Committee of their decision.

The Executive Committee at once directed General Kornilov to order the military units back to their barracks. It also issued a proclamation urging the population to keep calm. This proclamation included the following instructions to the troops:

In these troubled days do not go out into the streets carrying arms unless so ordered by the Executive Committee. To the Executive Committee alone belongs the right to dispose of you. Any order calling military units out into the streets, with the exception of routine orders, must be issued on a form of the Executive Committee, sealed with its seal, and signed by at least two from the following list of members. . . .

Kornilov bowed to the order of the Executive Committee and called the troops back. However, he felt insulted by this interference in his own sphere of action and soon resigned.

Normally, the leading majority of the Executive Committee avoided assuming government functions. But at that moment the country stood on the brink of civil war. The first bloody clashes between demonstrators for and against the government had already occurred. Artillery mounted in the middle of the Palace Square was bound to have an inflammatory effect. It was this emergency that prompted the Executive Committee to appropriate government functions and to employ extraordinary measures in order to save the country from a civil war.

The part played by the Bolshevik party in the events of April was of little importance. True, the Bolsheviks used spontaneous street demonstrations as an opportunity for unbridled demagogic propaganda against the government and the policy of cooperation. Here and there Bolshevik agitators tried to incite the crowds to demand the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. Yet the bulk of the demonstrators, notably the soldiers, showed such a distrust of them, that the Bolshevik party, headed by Lenin, found it necessary to display great restraint, throughout the crisis, regarding the issue of the removal of the government.

The attitude of the Bolshevik party during those days is vividly reflected in the resolutions proposed by Lenin, adopted by the Central Committee of the party on April 21 and 22 and published in the party press.

The resolution of April 21 read as follows:

Party agitators and speakers must repudiate the vile slander spread by the capitalist press to the effect that we threaten the country with civil war. This is an infamous lie, since at the present moment—when the capitalists and their government cannot and dare not use force against the masses, when the masses of workers and soldiers can freely express their will and freely elect and remove all authorities—at such a moment the very idea of civil war is naïve, senseless, and absurd; at such a moment it is necessary to submit to the will of the majority of the people, as well as to admit the right of a dissenting minority freely to criticize this will. Should violence break out, the responsibility for this must be born by the Provisional Government and its supporters.¹

The second resolution, voted on Lenin's motion on April 22, declared:

The slogan "Down with the Provisional Government!" is a mistake at this time, since in the absence of a reliable (conscious and organized) majority of the people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, such a slogan is either an empty phrase or else it stands, in fact, for enterprises of an adventurous nature.

Only then shall we advocate the transfer of power to the proletarians and semi-proletarians, when the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has been won over to our policy and is willing to take the power in its own hands.²

It is a significant feature of the April crisis that the initiative in the street events belonged largely to a man very little known at the time, F. F. Linde. It was he who led the Finlandsky regiment to the Mariinsky Palace. The bourgeois press represented him as a Bolshevik; actually he was a non-partisan idealistic intellectual. Holder

¹*Pravda*, April 22, 1917.

²*Pravda*, April 23, 1917.

of a university degree in mathematics, he had been called up during the war and was serving with the Finlandsky regiment as a private. He belonged to no party, but embraced the revolution with enthusiasm and was elected by his regiment as its delegate to the Executive Committee. Committee work, however, failed to satisfy his fighting temperament and he soon resigned from the Executive Committee. Under the immediate impact of Miliukov's note, Linde, outraged and indignant, took the initiative of calling his regiment to demonstrate against the government.

Linde's subsequent career helps to understand him and his frame of mind. When it became clear that the Executive Committee did not approve of the military demonstration, the regimental committee of the Finlandsky condemned Linde's action and resolved to dispatch him to the front with the very next platoon that would receive marching orders. Members of the Executive Committee who knew Linde as a convinced advocate of national defense and appreciated his unusual gifts and energy, recommended him for the post of assistant army commissar. He was appointed and soon distinguished himself by his strenuous efforts to restore discipline in the ranks. Before long he was promoted to army commissar at the southwestern front, and in August, when the army was already widely infected with Bolshevism, he met the death of a hero, killed by the soldiers of a mutinous Bolshevik regiment whom he had urged to return to the positions they had deserted.

I stress these facts in order to avoid, in my account of the April crisis, a mistake often made by the participants of these events who recorded their reminiscences long after the Bolshevik Revolution.

According to these witnesses, the collapse of the February Revolution was due to the fact that the leading majority of the Soviet democracy had failed, from the outset, to understand the true frame of mind of the troops. My friend Voitinsky, who had been a commissar of the Provisional Government at the front and had observed the psychology of the men at close quarters in the months immediately preceding the October upheaval, would in later years express this opinion to me whenever we discussed and evaluated the April events.

In those April days, he would argue, what outwardly seemed a struggle between the majority of the Executive Committee and the right wing of the Provisional Government, actually was the beginning of Lenin's campaign against the majority of the Executive Committee. We interpreted the motives of the populace in a far too

intellectual and idealistic manner as a spontaneous explosion of internationalism against Miliukov's nationalistic policy. In reality the element of internationalism in the April demonstrations was negligible. As a matter of fact, those were demonstrations in favor of an immediate peace, a peace at any price. Linde, of course, just like you and me, felt differently. But his regiment followed his call because his men believed that in protesting against "annexations and indemnities" they would bring peace closer, and that Miliukov, in insisting on the "guarantees," had increased for every one of them the danger of a prolongation of the war.

This interpretation no doubt contains a grain of truth, but it ignores one important aspect of the soldiers' mass psychology, clearly apparent during the first months of the Revolution. Of course, the troops longed for an immediate peace, and their bitter resentment against Miliukov sprang not from any "internationalism" but from their irritation with his opposition to a policy promising to hasten the conclusion of a general peace. At the same time the huge majority of the soldiers were sharply hostile to the propaganda of an immediate separate peace, which they had expressively nicknamed an "obscene peace." The soldiers' aversion to the slogan of "peace at any price" was rooted, on the one hand, in an elementary feeling of patriotism and the hatred of the foreign enemy, and, on the other, in their confidence in the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia, which, so they believed, had liberated them from the yoke of the old régime and was now doing its best to achieve a decent peace that would preserve the country from enslavement by the enemy. These feelings were sustained and strengthened by the influence of representatives of a workers' and peasants' intelligentsia within the ranks of the army.

Were it not for this facet of the soldiers' psychology in those days, how could we explain why every appeal for an immediate separate peace was strongly resisted by the troops and often led to the mobbing of those who agitated for it? It was this reaction that compelled the Bolshevik Central Committee, headed by Lenin, to publish the resolutions quoted above and publicly to brand as adventurers the Bolshevik agitators who had used the April demonstrations as an opportunity to call for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the immediate conclusion of the peace.

A tremendous shift in the mood of the troops had to occur before the longing for an immediate peace displaced all other instincts and emotions. The first impulse to such a shift was given by the Bol-

shevik action in July, which demonstrated the inability of the democracy to oppose to the violence of a leftist minority the power of the constituted authorities of the state.

Later I shall go into the causes of this change in the soldiers' attitude. The point is that in April the mood of the troops was different, and to explain the events of those days by feelings that took hold of the soldiers in a later period would be a distortion of the historical perspective.

The street demonstrations went on for two days, April 20 and 21. Despite all the efforts of members of the Executive Committee—in particular Chkheidze, Skobelev, and Gots among the troops, and Liber, Gvozdev, and Bogdanov among the workers—to reassure the crowds, the general excitement in the city did not subside. New demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were forming all the time. Shots were fired here and there, and the rumors of bloodshed increased the tension. While the Executive Committee appealed to the population to abstain from demonstrations, agitators of the Cadet party urged its supporters to demonstrate in favor of the government. The anti-government demonstrations, nevertheless, were much more numerous than those on the opposite side.

Similar demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were simultaneously taking place in Moscow.

In the morning of April 20, Prince Lvov invited me to his house for a consultation. Nekrasov was with him. Both were greatly upset and expressed their amazement at the reaction of the Executive Committee to Miliukov's supplementary note and its interpretation as a hostile act. When this note was discussed by the government, they told me, all the expressions used by Miliukov were explained by him in full accordance with the spirit of the act of March 27,³ the "victorious completion of the war" having no other meaning than the establishment of a democratic peace. To this I replied that the use of slogans and formulas associated in the public mind with militant imperialism for the purpose of elucidating democratic war aims was rather odd, to say the least. The very spirit of our agreement, the long debate that preceded the act of March 27, should have cautioned the government against such a mistake. Prince

³In the excerpts of these reminiscences printed in the April issue of *The Russian Review* (pp. 101, 102, and 103), errors in translation led to the confusion of the declaration of March 27, which was issued by the Provisional Government and was addressed to the citizens of Russia, with the Petrograd Soviet's appeal of March 14, addressed "to the peoples of the entire world." (Author's note.)

Lvov and Nekrasov insisted on their interpretation. We then discussed what was to be done.

Prince Lvov declared in the course of the crisis that, should the Soviet democracy withdraw its support from the government, the latter would be willing to resign. But he made no mention of this now, since neither the government nor the Soviet democracy seriously contemplated such an outcome.

I pointed out that in the opinion of the majority of the Executive Committee the crisis could be resolved only by the dispatch to the Allies of a new formal note annulling the meaning of Miliukov's previous commentary. I added that, of course, the best way to satisfy the Soviet democracy would be Miliukov's resignation. However, neither Lvov nor Nekrasov, both of whom on many former occasions had shown their displeasure with Miliukov's obstinacy and tactlessness, would even discuss the resignation of the Cadet leader, which inevitably would have been followed by that of all the other Cadet ministers.

To find a way out of the situation, Prince Lvov suggested official negotiations between the Provisional Government and the two organs from which it derived its authority: the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Committee of the Imperial Duma. Realizing that such a proposition would meet with the full approval of the Executive Committee, I immediately accepted it.

The Executive Committee unanimously and without discussion voted to accept the offer. The negotiations were set for 9 P.M. on the same day. After the vote, the Executive Committee in a body joined the plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet, urgently summoned because of the events.

The general assembly of the Petrograd Soviet reflected the tense and emotional atmosphere of the street demonstrations. The indignation stirred up by Miliukov's note was general. At the same time a feeling of alarm was in the air, caused by the sporadic fighting in the streets, a warning that the conflict might become the start of a civil war.

Turning this mood to account with great tact, Chkheidze proposed at the opening of the session that the meeting remain purely informative, pending the outcome of the negotiations with the government. He outlined the background of the conflict and told the assembly that the negotiations were to begin that very evening. He also made known the decision of the Executive Committee to insist on the

dispatch of a new formal note precluding any possibility to interpret the Act of March 27 in the spirit of Miliukov's supplementary note. He expressed the conviction that the government, faced with the clearly manifested will of the masses, would be compelled to satisfy the demand of the Soviet democracy.

This speech was well received and set the tone for the addresses that followed. Denunciations of Miliukov's note evoked stormy applause. However, when a Bolshevik speaker, Fyodorov, tried to persuade the assembly that now was the time for the Soviet democracy to assume the full power, the audience reacted with such hostility that no other Bolshevik leader ventured to take the floor after him.

It was characteristic of the attitude of the Soviet during that first flare-up of civil strife, whose echo drifted in from the streets, that awareness of its own strength, far from impelling it to use its power against the government, aroused in it a sense of responsibility and the desire to put an end to the crisis. An unchecked development of the conflict, it was felt by all, would prove fatal not only to the government, but to the Revolution in general. This line of thought made the assembly highly responsive to the straightforward, over-simplifying, yet politically clear-sighted speech by Stankevich.⁴ He said:

You should appraise the situation in the light of the general objectives of the democracy, and if you find that no negotiations would be of any use and that the Provisional Government should be overthrown at once, then it should be clear that neither demonstrations nor violence are needed. The power after all is in your own hands; it belongs to you and to the masses behind you. You see that big clock on the wall, don't you? It shows fifteen minutes to seven. This very minute you can order the Provisional Government to resign. Just convey this decision to the government over the telephone, and it will surrender its authority within the next ten minutes. By seven o'clock the Provisional Government will have ceased to exist. Yet it is open to question whether it would be as easy to give the country a new and better government acceptable to the whole nation.

These words were cheered by the assembly. The Soviet resolved to await the result of the negotiations with the Provisional Government and broke off the session until six o'clock of the next day.

The joint session of the Provisional Government, the Executive Committee, and the Committee of the Duma took place in the evening of April 20, at the Mariinsky Palace. A crowd gathered in

⁴A prominent member of the Labor Group (Trudoviki) and its representative on the Executive Committee.

front of the Palace, cheering the government. Miliukov and Nekrasov went out to the crowd and thanked the people for their support. However, the anti-government demonstrations reported to us from all parts of the city were much more impressive, and the government had no illusions regarding the actual situation. It was at that meeting that Prince Lvov made known the readiness of the government to resign should the Soviet democracy withdraw its support.

During that joint session, the Provisional Government made every effort to steer the discussion away from Miliukov's note and to guide it into the channel of a broad analysis of the general situation.

Prince Lvov, in opening the session, said that the acute crisis brought on in Petrograd by Miliukov's note was only a symptom of the generally abnormal relationship between the government and the Soviet. Lately, he said, the active bond between us has been broken, and we are aware that the Soviet no longer trusts us; and yet the government has done nothing to justify this distrust. We realize that the support of the Soviet democracy is indispensable to us; accordingly, we have endeavored to reach our decisions on all issues in cooperation with the contact commission of the Executive Committee and we have duly carried out these decisions. We were undismayed by the formula of support "dependent on. . . ." But we have come to feel that the will to support us no longer exists. On the contrary, there is a tendency to undermine the authority of the government. That's why we have found it necessary to invite you here in order to talk things over frankly. We have to decide whether under the present circumstances we can still be useful in our responsible position. If this is not the case, we are ready, for the good of the country, to relinquish our authority and to make room for others.

Then Prince Lvov let the ministers have the floor.

The ministers, following the example of their Premier, spoke in such a way as to avoid appearing as defendants who came to justify themselves in the matter of Miliukov's note. They confined themselves to reporting on general conditions in their respective departments. Guchkov for the War Ministry, Shingaryov for the Ministry of Provisions, Nekrasov for Communications, and Tereshchenko for Finance, described the situation created by the war and the Revolution and told of their difficulties.

Guchkov's report followed the same pattern as the "confidential discussions" he had held a few times with the contact commission

at his Ministry on the Moika. In the first part he summarized the situation of the army on the eve of the Revolution. On the strength of his own observations and his talks with the army commanders, he asserted that the ineptitude and inefficiency of the Tsarist government had been driving the country to military disaster. In the second part of his report Guchkov described the conditions as they had developed since the Revolution. There was a considerable improvement, he said, in the supply of munitions, while the food situation remained critical. Then he proceeded to the thorniest problem, the morale of the troops. Guchkov had always shown great concern about this matter; but while in the past, in his "confidential discussions" with us, he had shown himself eager to strengthen the cooperation with the Soviet democracy and had been willing to concede that the army organizations created by the Revolution may have a wholesome influence—the picture he drew now was one of unrelieved gloom. The main evil was "the pacifist ideas that were flooding the army." "I should consider myself a criminal," he said, "if I failed today to instill into your minds the poison of alarm—deadly but salutary." Any propaganda of a general peace, no matter with how many reservations regarding the need to defend the country, tended to demoralize the men who were apt to take the talk about peace all too literally. In conclusion Guchkov touched on the street demonstrations. In his capacity as War Minister, he said, he used a different approach to issues of foreign policy, dependent on where they were dealt with. In the ranks of the army, he regarded any discussion of peace as definitely harmful. As for a clarification of war aims by the government, there was no disagreement about this between the government and the Soviet democracy, since the condition of the country clearly made it imperative to abandon all idea of conquest.

Shingaryov then spoke of the critical food situation, especially in the army. Floods and impassable roads had wrought such havoc with transportation that, instead of the three to four hundred carloads of food the army needed daily, no more than sixty to seventy were reaching the front. Shingaryov stressed, however, the energetic measures he had taken and expressed the hope that they would bear fruit in the near future, with the resumption of navigation.

Tereshchenko reported on the grave financial situation. During the war, the national debt had risen from nine to forty billion rubles. Military expenditures exceeded fifty million rubles daily. He expressed the hope that the democracy would support the Liberty

Loan, and also informed us that his department was working at full speed on a plan for the extension of direct taxation.

Nekrasov described the difficulties in the field of transportation and told of the remedial measures he had taken in collaboration with the organizations of railway workers and employees.

These three reports, concerned with the difficulties created by three years of war, contained no charges against the revolutionary democracy; on the contrary, they emphasized the government's need for its support. Nevertheless, a few incidental remarks prompted by the street demonstrations reflected the ministers' desire to shift the responsibility for the conflict from the government to the Soviet democracy. Thus, Nekrasov remarked that a "fateful mistake" was being made by those who professed to see a discrepancy between the foreign policy of the government and the aspirations of the leading organs of the democracy. Tereshchenko, in mentioning Miliukov's note, expressed surprise that it could have been interpreted as a repudiation of the policy proclaimed by this same government in the Act of March 27 and blamed the revolutionary democracy for having taken a hostile position on the basis of unfounded suspicions.

As for Miliukov himself, he made no report on the general situation and took the floor only to answer our direct criticism of his note and our request for explanations.

The note, he said, had been misunderstood. The expressions found so objectionable by the Soviet democracy had been included for the sole purpose of dispelling the rumors current in the West with regard to Russia's alleged intention to withdraw from the alliance with the Western powers and to conclude a separate peace with Germany. Without an accompanying note refuting such a misapprehension of Russian policy, the Act of March 27 might have been received as a confirmation of these rumors. To send a new explanatory note under the pressure of street demonstrations, he considered impossible, since this would only increase the alarm of our Allies. Miliukov then, to general bewilderment, read out, as a decisive proof of the correctness of his point of view, a secret telegram from a little-known French diplomat, conveying the information that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs disapproved the idea of an inter-Allied conference for the revision of war aims.

On behalf of the Executive Committee, Chkheidze, Chernov, Skobelev, Stankevich, and I spoke for the majority, Sukhanov and Kamenev for the minority. We made it perfectly clear that what

we objected to in the supplementary note was not the attempt to disassociate the government from the idea of a separate peace (at that time the revolutionary democracy unanimously rejected this idea), but the adoption of the slogans used by the imperialists of all countries in their fight against the democratic slogan of a general peace.

Sukhanov, in his *Notes on the Revolution*, faithfully enough records the gist of the speeches delivered by each of us at that session. In this particular account, as in all the seven richly detailed volumes of his *Notes*, he makes a point of recording the facts with the greatest possible accuracy.⁵ Nevertheless, his subjective, polemical approach that marks the *Notes* often results in a distortion of the inner significance of the events.

Sukhanov draws a distinction between the speeches of the majority members and those of the left-wingers of the Executive Committee: the first, according to him, were anxious to come to terms with the government, while the leftists stated their views, unconcerned about the outcome of the meeting.

Actually, despite the harsh criticism of Miliukov's note by the spokesmen of the majority and of the left-wing alike, the joint session showed plainly that the entire Executive Committee, regardless of party affiliations, desired the resumption of the policy of co-

⁵However, he does not always succeed in avoiding factual errors. In describing the meeting at the Mariinsky Palace, for instance, he mentions a speech allegedly made by a former member of the first Duma, Ramishvili (*Notes*, Vol. 3, p. 284). Actually, Ramishvili was not present. He could not be, since a month before this he had left for Georgia, accompanying the body of Chkheidze's son, killed accidentally, and had not returned to Petrograd. Sukhanov's mistake was obviously due to the following circumstance: The press had not been admitted to the joint session, and the reporters had to depend on second-hand information. At that session I spoke twice, once to express our dissatisfaction with Miliukov's note and to ask him for explanations, and the second time to reply to him. My first speech was erroneously attributed by some of the excluded journalists to Ramishvili, and Sukhanov, although he had been present, probably used newspaper material to refresh his memory and thus repeated the mistake. What is embarrassing is that Sukhanov, in his account of the session, refers not to the press but to his own recollection: "Of the speakers for the majority," he writes, "I have forgotten one, but I remember Chkheidze, Tseretelli, Chernov, Skobelev, and Ramishvili" (*Notes*, Vol. 3, p. 270).

In 1922, in Berlin, Sukhanov, in discussing his *Notes* with me, remarked: "With my political views you will, of course, disagree, but you will be hard put to it to find factual inaccuracies in my *Notes*. When I called his attention to his mistake about Ramishvili, he was greatly disconcerted and kept repeating: 'I don't know why, but I was sure I was writing from personal recollection.'"

operation with the government. The hot breath of civil war, which for the first time had touched the revolutionary country, had deeply alarmed us all, and the leftists avoided anything that might have jeopardized an understanding.

Despite their insistence that the government disavow Miliukov's attempt to revive the slogans of a militant imperialism, the representatives of the majority of the Executive Committee understood that the government should not and could not be forced to give them satisfaction in a humiliating form. We did not even go so far as to demand Miliukov's resignation, since we were aware that under the existing circumstances the resignation of the Cadet ministers would have only aggravated the crisis. Chernov was the only speaker to intimate, with great restraint and full acknowledgment of Miliukov's distinction as a scholar, that at some future time Miliukov might be more useful to the country as Minister of Education than in his present capacity. Chernov spoke on behalf of the majority of the Executive Committee; as for the leftists, none of them raised the issue.

Kamenev, speaking with studied calmness, asserted that the crisis had its roots in the fundamental conflict between the aspirations of the propertied classes and those of the proletariat; he added, however, that the Bolshevik fraction he represented did not strive, at the moment, to overthrow the government. Sukhanov defended the demand of the Internationalists for a more energetic peace policy with arguments designed, as it were, to win the assent of the government. Referring to the reports just made by the ministers and appealing to their patriotism, he pointed out how much the economic difficulties as well as the disorganization of the front would be eased by a determined peace policy. But when the ministers took exception to some of his remarks, critical not only of Miliukov's note but of the activities of the government as a whole, he hastened to reassure them, declaring that his views were those of the minority and were not shared by the majority of the Executive Committee.

Miliukov's statement that it was impossible to dispatch a new note to the Allies threatened to dash all hope of an understanding.

After his speech I took the floor and made it clear that for us, as for the entire revolutionary democracy, there was only one acceptable solution: the government must publish an additional explanation, clarifying the controversial issue in accordance with the policy laid down in the act of March 27. This explanation should be worded in unmistakable terms and communicated to the allied governments.

When I had finished, Nekrasov came up to me and invited me to help him draw up the text of such a statement. We retired to an adjoining room and in a short time, without much discussion, drafted the following text, submitted the next day for approval both to the government and to the Executive Committee:

Inasmuch as doubts have arisen regarding the interpretation of the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanying the communication of the declaration of the Provisional Government (of March 27) to the allied governments, the Provisional Government considers it necessary to clarify the following points: 1/ It goes without saying that this note, in referring to a decisive victory over the enemy, has in view the attainment of the aims laid down in the declaration of March 27 and expressed in the following words: "The Provisional Government regards it as its right and its duty to declare that the free Russia aspires neither to dominate other nations, nor to deprive them of their national property, nor to seize foreign territory by force, but aims at the establishment of a lasting peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not strive to increase its external might at the expense of other peoples and does not aim at the subjugation or humiliation of any nation. In the name of the supreme principles of justice it has removed the fetters that enchained the Polish nation. But the Russian people will not tolerate that its country emerge from the great struggle humiliated and with its vital strength diminished." 2/ The "sanctions and guarantees" of a lasting peace mentioned in the note are understood by the Provisional Government to mean restriction of armaments, international courts, etc. The present clarification will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the ambassadors of the allied powers.

On the following day this text was approved by the Provisional Government over Miliukov's objections.⁶

*Miliukov in his *History of the Russian Revolution* is no less subjective than Sukhanov in the interpretation of events, while much less careful about factual accuracy. The debate at the joint session at the Mariinsky Palace and its outcome are recounted by Miliukov as follows:

"One after another, the Ministers of War, Agriculture, Finance, Communications, and lastly Foreign Affairs, rose to make their reports and to enlighten the rather heterogeneous assembly about the situation in every sphere of the national life. Their reports made a strong impression, and the willingness to come to terms was strengthened in consequence of the session. After the refusal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue a new note, Tseretelli agreed to the publication of an official clarification of only those two passages that had been most bitterly attacked. . . . The next day, by 5 P.M., the text had been discussed by the government, shown to Tseretelli and approved by him. . . . The obvious discrepancy between the modest scope of the explanations and the irritation caused by the real contradiction between the note of April 18 and the Zimmerwald philosophy of the Soviet, reveals better than anything else the weakness of the position of the Soviet leaders." (P. N. Miliukov, *History of the Russian Revolution*, Vol. I, pp. 95-96). Such an account and such an interpretation of the facts make it difficult to understand why Miliukov, only two weeks later, with the tacit acquiescence of the other Cadet ministers, was compelled to resign.

The only changes in the above text introduced at the insistence of Miliukov were the shifting of the first and second paragraphs to second and third place and the addition of the following sentence to form a new first paragraph: "The note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been the subject of a thorough and lengthy deliberation by the Provisional Government, and its text has been unanimously approved."

The Executive Committee, to which I communicated the declaration drawn up the day before by Nekrasov and myself, discussed the text at the same time that it was studied by the government. The majority members declared themselves ready to accept the statement as satisfactory. The Internationalists and the Bolsheviks spoke against it. The lively debate was interrupted time and again by news of demonstrations and clashes in various parts of the city.

At 5 P.M. the Provisional Government informed us of its decision and sent us the final text it had approved. Without hesitation, the majority of the Executive Committee unanimously decided to content itself with the government's declaration and to invite the plenum of the Petrograd Soviet, which had been waiting for us, to ratify this decision and to announce to the population that the conflict was over. The Internationalists and Bolsheviks voted against this.

When we took our decision to the Petrograd Soviet, the streets were still filled with demonstrating crowds.

The two thousand members of the general assembly of the Petrograd Soviet were waiting for us in the spacious hall of the Naval Academy in a high state of excitement.

On behalf of the Executive Committee, I announced its decision to the assembly. When I read out the text of the government's statement and announced that the Executive Committee considered the conflict settled, the entire assembly rose and gave the Executive Committee an enthusiastic ovation. Then I proposed a resolution expounding the history of the conflict, its origin and outcome. It read:

. . . The Provisional Government carried out the demand of the Executive Committee. It communicated the text of its declaration repudiating annexations to the governments of the allied powers. . . . However, a note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented this communication with a commentary that could be understood as an attempt to weaken the actual purport of the government's step. . . .

The unanimous protest of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd brought it to the notice of the Provisional Government as well as of all the peoples of the

world that the revolutionary democracy of Russia would never reconcile itself to a return to the purposes and methods of the tsarist foreign policy and that, now and in the future, the uncompromising struggle for international peace would be its cause. . . .

This protest prompted the government to issue a clarifying statement precluding the possibility of an interpretation of the note of April 18 in a spirit contrary to the interests and demands of the revolutionary democracy. And the fact that the first step has been taken to make the issue of the renunciation of forcible annexations the subject of international discussion, must be recognized as a major achievement of the democracy.

This resolution, opposed by Kamenev and Kollontay on behalf of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, was approved by a majority of two thousand votes against thirteen.

While the vote on this resolution was being taken, news arrived of a bloody fight between two demonstrating groups on Nevsky Prospekt. Dan and Skobelev, who, as delegates of the Executive Committee, happened to have been present at the start of the incident, told the assembly of the suddenly fired shots and of the bloodshed. On their motion, the meeting unanimously resolved:

- 1/ To urge the citizens to refrain from any kind of demonstrations in the streets and public squares;
- 2/ To brand any incitement to armed demonstrations as a betrayal of the cause of the Revolution and of freedom;
- 3/ To request all members of the Soviet to proceed at once to the arrangement of meetings in factories, plants, and barracks, in order to carry into effect the decisions that had been adopted.

The news of the resolutions announcing the settlement of the conflict and the prohibition of demonstrations spread through the capital with lightning speed, and suddenly, as if by magic, the demonstrations came to an end and perfect quiet was restored. The next day the entire press, without exception, praised the amazing discipline of the masses, their readiness, even with passions running high, to follow the lead of the organs of the democracy. The Soviet emerged from the conflict with increased prestige and power.

Thus ended the crisis which had a deep influence on the subsequent course of the Revolution. While the part played by the Bolsheviks in the April events was quite insignificant, the crisis showed them how easily the masses of workers and soldiers could be aroused and brought out into the streets, how deeply ingrained in the masses was the distrust of the propertied class, and how blindly the right-wing bourgeois circles were tending to prepare the ground for a civil war.

But what the April events had demonstrated most plainly was the brittleness of the bond between the government and the Soviet. They led to the first cabinet crisis and to the formation of a coalition government.

(To be continued)

Moscow University

1755-1955

BY CYRIL BRYNER

I

THIS year Moscow University, the oldest Russian University, is celebrating its bicentenary. Before 1755, Russia had an Academy of Science founded by Peter the Great with an attached "Academic University"—but it was hardly more than a secondary school which languished away for lack of pupils, until it was reestablished as a separate University in 1819.

In spite of its comparative youth and short priority over other Russian universities which date from 1804, Moscow University has attained a position of venerability and intimacy with history not unlike that of Oxford or the University of Paris. Moscow University's monopoly of higher education in the eighteenth century made it the center of culture and enlightenment for the whole country. This monopoly was broken in the nineteenth century, but size and a central location still gave it the dominant rôle. A partnership with the great men of letters and science of Russia, together with a close contact and participation in the politics of the country, made it one with the history of Russia. "Its pulse was the pulse of the whole country" wrote one of its professors.

Moscow University was created by an *ukaz* of Empress Elizabeth on January 25, 1755 and opened the following April in temporary quarters. The court and general public attended the opening ceremonies and festivities which lasted until four in the morning.¹

¹The University was moved shortly after from temporary quarters to the location which, in part, it still occupies opposite the Kremlin. But most of its buildings were burnt down, and its 20,000 volume library and valuable collections lost during the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon in 1812. The reconstructed University arose around a main hall that was imposing and airy, "a true temple of learning," and also contained barracks-like living quarters.

The new structure of Moscow University, completed in 1953, consisting of a 32-story central building, 27 main buildings and ten auxiliary, with rooms for 5,754 students, apartments for 184 professors, 198 auditoriums and more than one thousand laboratories, houses the Physics, Chemistry, Mechanico-Mathematical, Geography and Geology faculties, is separated from the Arts Faculties which remain at the old University site.

The real founders of the University were Count Ivan Shuvalov, who as a curator, held a position similar to that of chancellor for the first forty-two years of the University's existence; and Michael Lomonosov, whose name the present University bears.

Shuvalov, one of the great courtiers of the eighteenth century lent his powerful patronage to the University. Enlightened and patriotic, he envisioned Moscow University as the apex of a system of schools that was to spread over the whole of Russia. Shuvalov recommended Moscow to the Imperial Senate as the site of the University because, he argued, it was not only a center of population but the center of the rising middle class from which students could be drawn; St. Petersburg, the capital, could recruit teachers for private, elementary, and secondary schools from foreigners who were immigrating to Russia through St. Petersburg, but a university at Moscow would be a training center for teachers for the rest of Russia; in the Moscow region life was cheaper and students could be aided by the many relatives and friends they would be sure to find in the area.

As a product of a German university education, Lomonosov wished to build the new university on western models. Lomonosov, who had established himself as the most effective champion of the dignity and importance of science and scholarship in an age in which scholars were placed by the great lords of the day in the same category as their domestic servants, insisted on complete autonomy and academic freedom for his new institution.

The great degree of autonomy the University attained became its most treasured prize and most persistent subject of conflict with the government. The various privileges, such as separate university courts, remission of certain taxes for students and professors, seemed to belong to the middle ages rather than to the eighteenth century, but were not anachronistic in a Russian society which had sharply-drawn class distinctions. Students wore uniforms and powdered wigs, and were disciplined by having their swords removed and being placed on bread and water. The class distinction that had been drawn in the establishment of separate nobles' and middle class gymnasiums was not made within the University itself. It did exclude the peasantry and serfs from courses, but there was no reason why they could not attend the public lectures, which became a daily feature of the University and more important than the lectures for the regular courses.

The original University was to consist of three faculties: Law,

Medicine, and Philosophy, with ten professors—three in Law teaching Universal Jurisprudence, Russian Jurisprudence, and Politics; the three medical professors were to lecture on Chemistry, Natural Science, and Anatomy; while the courses of the Philosophy Faculty were: philosophy, experimental and theoretic physics, rhetoric and history. Mathematics and languages also seem to have been in the first curriculum but were not always taught by regular professors. But this plan remained an ideal rather than a fact during the first decades of the University. Both professors as well as students were difficult to acquire. Only two Russians were found for the original faculty. Latin became the language of instruction for the predominantly German faculty. It was with difficulty that Russian gained parity. Frequently, the whole burden of the Medical or Law faculty was carried by one man. While there were fifty government scholarships available, they were not always filled.

According to the original plan, each professor was to deliver a two-hour public lecture daily, including Sunday but excluding Saturday, on which a faculty meeting would be held and the students would conduct a public disputation. Though a few professors found private tutoring more lucrative than their public and private lectures, the public lecture became one of the most unique and characteristic features of Moscow University and of Moscow life as a whole, not only for the remainder of the eighteenth century, but also for a good part of the nineteenth. The contact that the public lectures established with all classes of society created a widespread support and interest in the new University and plunged it into the middle of events. Moscow University was never able to build an ivory tower.

The University was governed by an unspecified but small number of curators appointed by the monarch. Current University affairs were conducted by a Director who was responsible to the curators and who met with the faculty weekly to discuss administrative and pedagogical problems. This type of administration lasted until 1803 when the offices of curator and director were abolished. Moscow, and the then newly created universities, were placed under a Ministry of Education and in turn were made administrators of the secondary and primary schools of their districts. The actual administration of the University became self-elective, the faculty electing its own rector and deans.

The faculties and teaching staff were considerably broadened throughout the nineteenth century. At first the faculties were

reorganized into four, with twenty-eight chairs or departments. Ethico-Political studies absorbed the Law faculty and included theologians, philosophers, and political scientists, with such chairs as Religion, Church History and Scriptures, the Laws of the Most Noted Ancient and Modern Peoples, Diplomacy, and Political Economy. The Physico-Mathematical faculty comprised the natural as well as the physical sciences and had a special chair in the Technology of Science as related to industry and commerce. The Medical faculty's six chairs included one in veterinary sciences. The old Philosophy faculty was reorganized into a Faculty of Letters, with chairs in Eloquence, Versification, and the Russian Language; Universal History, Statistics, and Geography; Eastern Languages; and The Theory of Fine Arts and Archeology. As in the eighteenth century, it was sometimes difficult to find people to measure up to the grandiloquence of the designated chairs.

Though the office of curator had been abolished, "Protectors" were later appointed in their place. At first they were like the noblemen-curators of the eighteenth century who served as cushions between the University and the court, government and church. Prince J. P. Obolensky (1817-25) and Prince S. M. Galitsin in the thirties served well in this rôle. Though according to Herzen, a student of the thirties, Galitsin could not understand why lectures should not go on if a professor was sick; and as a consequence would pick the next man on the list, so that occasionally a Father Ternovsky would lecture at the clinic on women's diseases and the gynecologist Richter, would discourse on the Immaculate Conception.

After the first third of the century, the protector was more likely to be a high government bureaucrat with less power of intercession with the authorities and a greater tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the University.

In 1849 the "Reaction" of Nicholas had set in. The "iron emperor" who always regarded the University with suspicion as a center of free thought and sedition, placed professors and students under strict surveillance, raised student fees, and restricted entry to the University; abolished the teaching of philosophy and the politics and laws of foreign countries; and limited the teaching of psychology and logic to the Professor of Religion.

The above restrictions were removed by the University code of 1863, which restored the University's autonomy, with the exception of the corporate autonomy of the students, which had grown obsolete. The number of chairs or departments was almost doubled to

fifty-three. After the comparatively liberal Alexander II was succeeded by Alexander III, a man more in the Nicholas I mold, a new code was drawn up in 1884 which took away much of the regained autonomy. The swing to liberalism in 1905, again restored autonomy besides granting other privileges to the University. The conflict between the University and Government flared up again in 1911, with the temporary dismissal of the rector and two professors and the resignation of 130 others.

II

After Bolshevik seizure of power a state of near-inertia existed between the Government and the University. Novikov, the elected rector, actually negotiated on the question of autonomy with Lunacharsky, National Commissar of Education, and his deputy, the Marxist historian Pokrovsky. By 1920 the Soviet government succeeded in installing its own rector, D. Bogolievov, while arresting and exiling some of the old professors and appointing many of its functionaries to the faculty. In 1922 the policy of having student government replace faculty government further strengthened Soviet control of the University. In 1946 Moscow and other Soviet universities were transferred from the Ministry of Education to the more specialized scrutiny and supervision of a Ministry of Higher Education.

The early Soviet period was marked by considerable improvisation in curriculum and administration—thus paralleling what was taking place in the Soviet government itself. Though the Bolsheviks were guided by a set and developed political philosophy, they had no experience in government; consequently, the mechanics of administration developed by the experimental method—departments were improvised, then promoted, demoted, abolished, absorbed or multiplied. The faculties of Moscow University went through much the same process. First appeared the *Rabfaks*, the Workers' Faculties, in 1919, which soon spread from Moscow to other universities. The *Rabfaks* were based on the assumption that the conquering proletariat should have access to the best things in life in the new society, and consequently, universities should be open to the workers regardless of their academic preparation. When it was discovered that the workers and peasants could not always keep up in their studies, the *Rabfaks* were formed as part of and apart from the University. Besides university studies, the *Rabfaks* concerned themselves with secondary and even primary education under the titles of university

courses. At first, students graduated in two weeks and then six months, eight months and finally, in three years, until *Rabfaks* were absorbed into secondary and Adult Education schools by 1941.

Social Science has played the rôle of hero, and Law that of the villain in the new re-groupings of the faculties. By 1921 Social Science had absorbed most of the Humanities. What remained of the latter was incorporated into research institutes. In 1923 Moscow had three Faculties; in 1925 there were four, and five in 1930. In the process, Law had been reconstituted as an entirely separate institute and Social Science, Philosophy, and Medicine also moved on along their separate ways until Moscow had become purely a science school. Physically, the University was divided into Moscow State University No. 1 and an abortive Moscow State University No. 2. By 1930, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction and the Historical Faculty, roughly corresponding to an Arts Faculty, was restored to the University. The Faculties as now constituted are: Physics, Mechanico-Mathematic, Chemistry, Geography, Biology-Soil, Geology, History, Philology, Philosophy, Law, and Economics. One of the features of the Biology Faculty is a department of Darwinianism and Genetics. Anthropology is taught in the Biology faculty rather than in the Arts. There are departments of Psychology and of Logic in both the Philosophy and Philology faculties. Philology has important departments of Iranian Philology and Turic Philology. The department of Journalism within the Philology faculty is one of the few remaining evidences of the applied sciences tendency of earlier Soviet higher education.

III

The liveliest and most graphic of all Russian memoirists, Alexander Herzen, wrote that before 1812 Moscow professors could be divided into two classes—the Germans and non-Germans. Some of the Germans were good-natured and learned, but had a spirit of Western exclusiveness that made them completely indifferent to the students and to the Russian language, while the non-Germans knew only Russian and were uncouth and servile in their patriotism. The Germans were from Gottingen; the Russians were sons of the lower clergy; the Germans smoked too many cigars; the Russians drank too much liquor.

Fonvizin, Russia's greatest playwright of the eighteenth century and one of the very first students at the University, wrote in very much the same vein. But Fonvizin's and Herzen's full accounts

easily contradict their amusing generalizations. There was much that was incompetent and funny in the early teaching staff but the effect of their efforts were benign and cultural.

The most memorable Moscow professor of the eighteenth century, Johann Schwarz, a Transylvanian German, had come to Russia in 1776 as tutor for one of the great noble families. Soon after, he became a lecturer in German at the University, and then branched out into Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Pedagogy. Schwarz symbolized both the virtues and short-comings of the Moscow professor of the first hundred years. A dilettante with no academic standing, his many-sidedness and general culture so characteristic of Russia's renaissance-like eighteenth century, compensated for his inadequacies as a scholar. His moralistic, cultured eloquence was a type particularly prized by the Russians. Long after Schwarz was retired from the University because of his radicalism, pupils and parents visited him to thank him for the high moral principles he had instilled in them. Schwarz backed his idealism with deeds, sacrificing his fortune to the spread of education in Russia, leaving himself and his family destitute. He was the center of a small group of Freemasons who formed the strongest cultural and most radical social force in eighteenth century Russia, which brought a critical and objective sense into Russian literature; and which worked mightily to spread literacy and democracy throughout the country. Schwarz was supported by the university curator, Kheraskov, himself a Freemason, and by Novikov, editor of the University printing press, Russia's leading literary journalist of Catherine the Great's age, who like Schwarz, was persecuted for his suspect ideas and activities.

Due to the importance of the public lecture in the life of the University, the orators on the faculty have been the most remembered and most influential professors. To this group belongs one of the most famous of all Moscow professors, Granovsky, who began teaching General History in 1839. A graduate in Law from the University, he occupied an obscure government post and wrote little-noticed literary articles. He was discovered by Count S. Stroganov, the protector of the University, a man of a very different temper from the liberal, westernizing Granovsky. As was customary with newly appointed professors, Granovsky was sent abroad to study before he took up his duties. Most of this time was spent in Berlin where he became imbued with the philosophy of Hegel, the most influential philosopher in Russia of Granovsky's times. In a

way, Schwarz was the precursor of Granovsky, as the latter had much the same character and influence. But Granovsky's significance and influence were much deeper and broader. It seems that there was hardly a Russian literary figure or thinker of his time who was not touched by him in some way. The author of two insignificant scholarly works, Granovsky earned his position of eminence solely through the lecture platform. Before his time, Moscow professors had achieved quite a virtuosity in utilizing all of the pyrotechnics of the speaker's art. Granovsky obtained his effects with the complete absence of the embellishments of oratory. His listeners all marked the simplicity and sincerity with which he spoke. Granovsky represented a Western liberalism that made him suspect to the authorities without classifying him as a revolutionary.

The roster of Moscow professors contains some very eminent names but the very greatest names of Russian science and learning have been associated with other institutions. Though Lomonosov was the co-founder of the University, he never taught there; and Mendelev, Lobachevsky, Mechnikov, and Pavlov, to name the most prominent, studied and taught elsewhere.

If Moscow University is to be identified with a particular branch of study, it should be history—though it is also claimed that mathematics is its best department. Though Granovsky was a second-rate scholar, he set the pace for European Historical studies which produced such men as Vinogradov, who later transferred to Oxford. Almost all the great teachers and writers of Russian History were associated with the University. Pogodin and Kachenovsky are representative of the early Russian historians, when the subject was still in ferment. Russian history was stabilized in Sergei Soloviov's 29 volume history of Russia, and made brilliant and living by the greatest of Russian historians, Kliuchevsky, the pupil and successor of Soloviov. Kliuchevsky, marking the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, has many outstanding disciples: Miliukov (party leader, Foreign Minister, editor of an outstanding newspaper and also the author of the definitive cultural history of Russia), Kizevetter (the author of this article is indebted to his works on the early history of Moscow University), Liubavsky, Bogoslovsky, and many others.

Ideologically, Moscow represented and led the main currents of Russian thought; but it produced no philosophy of education. Moscow does not have an Oxford's Newman or Arnold, or Harvard's Eliot, or Columbia's Dewey to brew a distinctive pedagogical

flavor; Moscow reflects certain intellectual tendencies disassociated from pedagogy rather than systems of education. This tendency has been predominantly Western and liberal.

Before and immediately after the 1917 Revolution, the faculty could be described as Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) in temper—roughly resembling pre-world War I British Liberalism. Miliukov, the former professor of history, was the leader of this party. Lenin wrote in 1905 of the Moscow faculty: "Look at those liberal professors, rectors and their assistants in this whole company of Trubetskoi, Manuilovs and such . . . why these are the best people of liberalism and the Cadet party, the most thoughtful, the best educated, the most fair-minded, the most free of the pressure and interests of the money bag. And how do these people conduct themselves? . . . They fear the revolution. . . . Already they extinguish its flames."

When the Bolsheviks gained control, an unsuccessful attempt at class warfare within the faculty was instituted by promoting all instructors and lecturers of three years standing to full professors; while professors of ten years standing and over had their records re-examined; i.e., were subject to dismissal. A portion of the thirty Soviet candidates to a Faculty of Social Science were naively rejected by the University authorities. According to Novikov, rector of the University, Bukharin, one of the original members of the Politburo and at one time recognized by Lenin as the Party's leading ideologist, was rejected by the dean with, "I do not know such an economist. What did he publish?" The editor of *Izvestiya* was unacceptable for the same reason. After the Soviet government managed to set up its own university administration, the former rector, dean, and administrators carried on a short-lived secret administration. The conflict came to a head when the faculty went on strike for higher wages and better living conditions. The strike was a failure principally because the Medical Faculty feared to join, as new Communist instructors and assistants were ready to take vacated places. Opposition to the government on the cultural front finally collapsed in 1922 when forty professors, writers, and artists were exiled abroad—a mark of special favor, instead of exile to Siberia or execution.

The Sovietization of the University has marked its close association with government. The Bolsheviks had indicated a back-handed esteem by naming its own leaders to the faculty. Moscow University has continued to be an arena for its leaders, from the now liquidated

Bukharin, to the Law Professor Vyshinsky. And a professorship has frequently been an apprenticeship to a high government post. But it has also tinged such people with the hazards of intellectualism. Voznesensky, the Politburo member dismissed after World War II, was a member of the Moscow Institute of Red Professors.

IV

In spite of a generous number of scholarships available, the first students were almost as few as the professors. At times the Medical and Law Faculties had but a single student. The first accurate figures belong to 1770, when 300 graduates were listed. At the height of the reign of Alexander I in 1822, there were 695 students enrolled. The number rose to 875 at the end of his reign in 1825. The reign of Nicholas I with its hostility to the intelligentsia, helped drop the enrollment to 438 in 1836, from which it rose in a decade to 1,251. But the revolutionary year of 1848 dealt a blow to liberal institutions and enrollment fell to 926. In 1870, the middle of the reign of Alexander II, there were about 1,500 students; and at the end of the century, about 3,500. By World War I, the enrollment rose to 9,892. The Bolshevik Revolution flung the doors wide to all manner of student. The teaching staff of 800 was sorely taxed to accommodate them. Lectures were given in shifts and often conducted in hallways. There were 13,299 students in 1918 and 27,000 in 1921. Most of these crowded into the Science Faculties which at one time had 13,500 students. The unqualified, however, soon dropped out reducing the number to 7,000. Many were very short-time students or belonged to the *Rabfak*, which was hardly a university at all. Due to the detachment of the Medical, Law, and Philosophy-History Faculties, the enrollment stood at 5,500 in 1928 in Moscow State University No. 1. The present enrollment, with some of the Faculties restored, is about 17,000.

Because most of the lectures in the eighteenth century and even some in the beginning of the nineteenth were delivered in Latin, ex-seminarians and priests' sons had a decided advantage over other students and formed the dominant group in the first student bodies. Coming from impoverished surroundings and belonging to one of the few educated groups in Russia, they formed a potential core of radicalism that became a characteristic of Moscow University.

The government did all it could to encourage the enrollment of the nobility. But most of the nobles were too busy serving in the Army or Civil Service, as had been decreed by Peter the Great. The gov-

ernment then recognized attendance at the University as equivalent to service in the Army or Civil Service. Graduates were presented with steel swords and given preferment in the government. By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the nobility formed the majority of the student body. Even to a greater degree, the University took on the characteristics of German and Central European universities as the training ground for the high government bureaucracy.

In spite of the aristocratic element that appeared in the nineteenth century, Moscow students felt that theirs was a more democratic environment than that of English higher education. Herzen wrote of the 1830s: "Social distinctions had not among us the distressing influence which we find in English schools and barracks. I am not speaking of the English universities. They exist exclusively for the aristocracy and the rich." Kerensky, looking back on his student days at St. Petersburg at the beginning of this century, declared that higher education was more accessible to the socially inferior in Russia than in England.

Herzen felt that the University had a great leveling and elevating influence; it formed "a common reservoir; in its halls they [the students] were purified from their superstitions they had picked up at the domestic hearths, reached a common level, became like brothers and dispersed again in all parts of Russia and among all classes." He described this as the University's glorious period that followed the dry scholasticism that had preceded it, and the German utilitarianism that was to follow, which used culture as the enrichment to practical projects.

Kizevetter, looking back at his student days in the '80s, divided the students into three groups: (1) the politicals, who organized student demonstrations and boycotts of courses, and who functioned secretly and dictatorially but as yet represented no political party or philosophy; (2) the dandified and conformist student who looked with disdain on both the politicals and scholars; (3) finally, the scholars.

Russia's leading writers usually had a rather hurried and often violent contact with the University. Moscow could claim about the same proportion of the great writers that Oxford or Cambridge could. Though not students, Pushkin and possibly Tolstoi, attended the University's famous public lectures. Pushkin debated on Russian history with members of the History Faculty. Turgenev studied there for a year when only fifteen, but remembered with gratitude his professor of Russian Language. Belinsky, Russia's leading

critic, poorly prepared and beset by poverty, was dismissed from the University for incompetence. Lermontov kept aloof from the plebian and radical element and left after two years, generally dissatisfied. Griboedov, the most scholarly of Russian writers, earned degrees both in Law and in Science. Chekhov spent five distracted years at the University during which he became a professional writer and earned his M.D.

The radicalism that was evident from the very beginning of the University finally gained a political coherence in the nineties and became a part of a nation-wide student organization, whose strikes became a potent political force. "Student movement" became synonymous with a "revolutionary movement."

The appearance of the Bolsheviks and the influx of loyal party men, changed the complexion of the student body slowly, since most of them were transitory *Rabfak* students. The established students had the same difficulties with the government that the faculty had.

The Soviet government complained in 1923 that it had only twenty party members among 4,000 students in the Physico-Mathematic Faculty. But by 1927, about 19% of the students belonged to the Young Communist League, and by 1937 more than 46% had joined.

The change in ideology and the material position of the student did not alter the character of the student body as much as could be expected. Before the Revolution, besides a low tuition, students were aided by a scholarship system that covered about 7% of them. Under the Communists, tuition was abolished and for a while, all university students were put on salary. Preference in entry was naturally given to party members and the proletariat. But this did not transform the University into a proletarian institution; it remained middle-class as it had in the few decades preceding the Revolution. According to Soviet figures in 1913, 37% of the students belonged to the minor nobility—in our understanding of this word, a good portion of these were members of the middle class; 10% were peasants, and the 5% "miscellaneous" students must have included or comprised the proletariat. The remainder belonged to the middle class. In 1927 workers comprised 20.4% and peasants 16% while 52% belonged to the bureaucracy and another 8% were the children of the intelligentsia, who might be included in the bureaucracy. In 1937, the number of workers rose to 28%, with 18% peasants but the bureaucracy, the new Soviet middle class, still held the dominant rôle with 36%, supported by the intelligentsia

with 14%. In 1919 only 17% of 400 of the top party leaders of the whole country were university trained; while in 1952, in the Moscow region alone, 70% of party leaders had a university education.

Even more urgent than the need for training good Communists was the need for specialists and technicians to participate in the industrialization of the country—particularly after 1928 and the Five Year Plans. This need threatened to make Moscow University into a purely Applied Science Institute. The two tendencies of the over-specialized student and the student politician came into conflict and were not resolved until the thirties. Stalin warned against the student-Communist who occupied himself with "higher politics" and did not learn a specialty and consequently did not become "a true leader of socialist construction." This description could apply to Malenkov himself, who subordinated his studies to the leadership of the Party faction within the University. But it also was "on the initiative of Comrade Stalin" that the humanities were rehabilitated in 1934, and over-specialization was declared to be "Left deviationism."

On the purely ideological front, the Party had to contend with a Social Revolutionary (agrarian-socialist) tendency, just as it contended with the Cadet tendency among the faculty; and all of the great heresies of the Party also reflected themselves in the University. One of Trotsky's last efforts to attain power was contained in the so-called "Platform of the Forty-Six," which was directed against the monolithism of the Party. The Platform was specifically addressed to students, and particularly to those of Moscow. It urged the Party to follow the leadership of the students, because they were "The Party's surest barometer." By the admission of Soviet historians, the appeal had its greatest success in Moscow. The great purges of the thirties exposed an "enemy of the people," Friedland, who with the help of "the Gestapo agent" Emelen, undermined the University with Trotskyism-Bukharinism through the "cosmopolitan" teachings of Pokrovsky—the very man whom the pre-revolutionary faculty had regarded as its nemesis.

Under Soviet power, the history of Moscow University has become the history of most other Soviet universities. Much of its identity—which has been associated at various times with its distinctive historical school, its Westernism, its radicalism and its integration with the community—has been lost among the eighty specialized schools of higher education, and various research institutions that have been crowded together with the University into Moscow and its environs.

The Shock-Battalions of 1917

Reminiscences^{*}

BY VICTOR MANAKIN

IN April 1917, in my capacity as Chief of the Political Staff Section of the front at Kamenets-Podolsk, and with the approval of General Dukhonin, Chief of Staff of the front, I gave a report at the conference of the southwestern front, which had been convoked by order of the Provisional Government, "On the strategic situation in the theaters of the World War." In this report, I showed that the efforts of the Bolsheviks to demoralize the Russian army were directly benefiting the Germans, who were waging war on two fronts. After I had secured the backing of the presidium of the conference, we took up next the question of voting for continuation of the war. This was a vote, unprecedented in history, taken by soldiers' deputies at the front, in time of war. The motion of the presidium was accepted by the conference. Ensign Krylenko, deputy from the Petrograd Soviet and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armies, was defeated.

After that, I introduced a motion for the formation of social shock-battalions to be made up of civilian volunteers, so that by the example of their personal bravery we might raise the fallen morale of the armies and endeavor to lead them along with us, in order to save the honor of Russia and fulfill her obligations to her allies. The conference accepted my motion unanimously. This was the last attempt to arrest the disintegration of the front. General Brusilov, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief at that time, confirmed the decision of the conference on the very same day and issued an order to have it circulated on all the fronts.

In fulfillment of this order of the Commander-in-Chief, the formation of shock-battalions and death units was begun on all the fronts, at the rate of one battalion to a division. They were made up of volunteer soldiers and of civilian volunteers.

The front-line shock battalions remained in their divisions in

^{*}This is the first of two instalments of the author's reminiscences of the Russian army during the fateful months preceding and immediately following the Bolshevik seizure of power [Ed.].

order to maintain order and discipline in the individual units. The collapse of the front was temporarily checked, but the battalions, which were scattered among the divisions, were powerless to undertake any action on a larger scale. The higher command could not make up its mind to concentrate these battalions for a larger-scale undertaking of a political nature, namely, the dispersal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd, because the Kerensky government was, to its own ruin, supporting the latter.

The formation of shock battalions of civilian volunteers was more complicated and required time. I took this task upon myself. On the very next day after the Commander-in-Chief had issued his order, I set up a central committee for the formation of shock battalions composed of civilian volunteers, and was elected its chairman.

On the same day we invited the delegation of sailors of the Black Sea fleet, which had come to the front with the same goal, upon the initiative of Admiral Kolchak, and which had supported my motion at the conference.

I proposed to the delegation that they join us and send delegates around to all the fronts and throughout all Russia in order to propagandize our patriotic idea and to recruit volunteers. My proposal was accepted and psychological warfare was begun in the fire of the Revolution.

Within three weeks, the first civilian volunteers, with no military obligations, began to arrive at headquarters of the southwestern front. These were primarily young people, members of the intelligentsia, and peasants, under the command of war veterans who had been wounded many times. At first, they came singly, then in groups, and finally in whole detachments.

In two months time, entire battalions started to arrive, some from such nests of Bolshevism as Oranienbaum, near Petrograd, and Tsaritsyn, later Stalingrad. There were battalions from Orenburg, Omsk, Kiev, Kharkov, and even Moscow. Most of them fought their way through to the front by force of arms.

The committee took care of receiving the arriving volunteers, of making arrangements for them, and of organizing them into units. The volunteers were arriving in excellent psychological condition and, even though they were untrained, they were inspired with the idea of performing a heroic exploit in the interests of their fatherland.

Junior command personnel was arriving with them, but we had to look for battalion commanders ourselves, since we were not authorized to accept officers from the front, lest their units become

weakened. The task was more than difficult in time of war, but we nevertheless found ways of solving it, by taking disabled men and those whose own soldiers had wanted to kill them.

We set about the work of organizing and of military training. When enough of the first arrivals among the volunteers had assembled for one company to be formed, the question came up of who would be the commanding officer of this company. The question was one of unusual importance for the consolidation of discipline among the volunteers.

At this time, cavalry Captain Lomakin of the Cuirassier Guard Regiment turned up at my office, having barely escaped lynching by his soldiers. He offered me his services as a volunteer. I said, "Go to the first company as an ordinary volunteer, leaving your officer's Cross of St. George on your chest, and go to sleep on a plank-bed like all the other volunteers. Tomorrow you'll be the company commander." That is just what he did, and the next day the company unanimously declared that it wanted Lomakin as commanding officer and that it would follow him wherever he ordered it to go. The committee approved the company's choice, and the company kept its word. It was the best company of the first shock-battalion and it carried out the most responsible assignments. The secret lay in the fact that he was the first combat officer to have turned up among the volunteers. And they responded to him with enthusiasm and confidence. One had to take into account the fact that this was a time of complete breakdown of discipline and confidence in officers.

A few days later, I was informed that in the Front Revolutionary Committee, which was led by Communists, a question had been raised about our battalions being possibly counter-revolutionary and about me as the chief instigator. I immediately sent over two members of our committee, both of them workers, to have a talk with the Front Committee. Both of my delegates were former "political prisoners" who had been amnestied after the Revolution.

In the evening they returned and gave me an account: "We came to the Committee, laid our revolvers down on the table of the presidium and said, 'We did fifteen years at forced labor. Which one of you did more than that? Nobody. Well, listen then. We ourselves know what kind of battalions we have and what kind of man our colonel is. If any one of you dares to say even one more word, he'll be dealing with us! Understand? And that's that!'" And they left. The Committee was at a loss for an answer. The primitive psy-

chology of the masses had to be dealt with in an even more primitive fashion. We were left in peace.

In June, our committee already had four activated battalions armed with Japanese rifles that Admiral Kolchak had sent us. In addition there were several thousand volunteers who had not yet been organized into units.

At this time, General Kornilov, who had escaped from German captivity and had been named Commander-in-Chief of the Front, came to Kamenets-Podolsk, where the headquarters of the southwestern front was located. He summoned me and asked: "I have been told that you have some battalions. Where are they? And do they obey orders?" The latter question is unusually significant for understanding the circumstances of that period. I explained and said that the battalions were completely reliable. "Who can give them orders?" asked Kornilov. I replied, "You, your Excellency, as Commander-in-Chief." Kornilov at once summoned General Dukhonin, the Chief of Staff, and ordered me to send our four shock-battalions to the front immediately with the mission of checking the armies of the southwestern front which were fleeing before the Germans.

When I reported that the battalions had no field-kitchens as yet, the General said that that made no difference for the moment, the main thing being that they had rifles. When I asked what to do with the remaining volunteers, who were not yet organized, General Kornilov appointed me commanding officer of the first shock regiment formed out of three as yet unactivated battalions.

A day later, the General summoned me again and said, "I have decided to demand that the Provisional Government take decisive measures for the restoration of discipline in the army, up to and including application of the death penalty. Can your battalions carry out this order?"

"Exactly the same as any other order," I replied.

"Then transmit this order of mine to your battalions, and I'll send a telegram to the government."

There was no other way. The only question was: who could carry out this order? In view of the tremendous upheaval in the demoralized army, infantry units of supreme reliability were necessary for such a purpose. There were no longer any such units at the front. Indeed, it was only by our shock-battalions that this assignment could be carried out, and at that only by those battalions that were composed of civilian volunteers, since these were not connected

with their divisions. The shock-battalions of the southwestern front were the ones who carried out this assignment.

The first shock-battalion under Captain Talalaev was sent to Tarnopol, the contact point of the retreating armies which had lost the capacity to resist the advancing German armies. The battalion consisted of one company of civilian volunteers under the command of cavalry Captain Lomakin, two companies of non-commissioned officers who had deserted their disorganized division, and one company of cadets who had come to the front in response to our call.

As Talalaev reported to me later, he found complete chaos upon his arrival at Tarnopol. There was neither military nor civilian authority there. The city was clogged with transports, artillery, and ammunition belonging to the retreating armies. In the city itself, widespread looting of the stores was going on, and, from the west, the Germans were advancing.

Talalaev dispatched the two companies of non-commissioned officers to cover the city, kept Lomakin's company at his own disposal, and sent the company of cadets to the east of the city to stem the wave of fleeing deserters. The two companies of shock-troopers dispersed in skirmish formation in the western outskirts of Tarnopol, along a front of about four kilometers, without machine-guns, without entrenching tools, and without reserves.

A German regiment was approaching the city, with the commanding officer and a band playing music at the head of the column. This was the customary triumphal march of the Germans against the armies of the revolution, which were absolutely without any discipline whatsoever.

The shock-companies opened fire. The band stopped playing. The commander of the German regiment, caught by surprise, ordered his men to disperse in skirmish formation, and sent for artillery in order to prepare an attack. He could not suppose it likely that there were only two companies at the front of the division.

An unevenly matched battle began, with two companies of shock-troopers against a foe many times stronger and equipped with machine-guns and artillery. The battle lasted for an entire day. The Germans were cautious and prepared the attack under cover of artillery fire. Our companies bore heavy losses for they had no entrenching tools, but they did not waver in spirit. They were made up of seasoned Russian soldiers, for whom nothing is impossible.

Towards evening, Talalaev ordered them to fall back. Ninety men did so, but 310 remained on the field of battle, killed or wounded.

There was no one to remove them. But time had been gained. This was the first battle of the shock-troopers with the Germans and they had withstood their baptism under fire.

At this point, the volunteer company captured the city and then and there arrested thirteen looters. In accordance with General Kornilov's order, they shot the looters on the spot, after a brief trial. The effect was astounding. The looting stopped immediately. The soldiers, who had been wandering about the city, took their places on their vehicles, the transports started moving, and by evening the city was cleared out. The artillery and ammunition of the army had been saved.

The company of cadets seized the bridges to the east of the city, and began to hold back the fleeing soldiers to organize them into companies with cadets in command, and to occupy trenches along the front towards the west. Four battalions were formed in all, and a position was occupied along a front six kilometers long. The breakthrough of the front in this sector was deflected and the front was re-established. This sector was taken over on the following day by the Petrovsky Brigade and by the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky Regiments of the Russian Guard, all of which had continued to maintain order.

The second Orenburg shock-battalion came to Kamenets-Podolsk directly from Orenburg, commanded by a second lieutenant. I did not even have time to see the battalion before it was sent off to Trembovlya, another critical sector of the front. Colonel Bleysh, a fellow-student of mine at the military academy, arrived at Kamenets-Podolsk the next day. As a disabled officer with only one arm, he had the right to enlist in our battalions. I explained the state of affairs to him and suggested that he take over the command of the second Orenburg battalion. He readily agreed. I wrote out an order to the second lieutenant to turn over the command of the battalion to him, Bleysh rode off in an automobile to overtake the battalion en route, and after he had overtaken it, he assumed command without even having seen his men.

Before reaching Trembovlya, Bleysh received an order from the commanding officer of the 22nd Corps to dismount at once and occupy a position on a mountain located at the corps' limiting point, at the break in the front, towards which the Germans were rushing. Bleysh led his men to the position. It was the eleventh hour. One German battalion advanced onto the same mountain from the west. The shock-troopers came out onto the ridge first, and since

they had only a small amount of cartridges, Bleysh gave the order "Follow me!" and without firing a shot led the battalion in a bayonet counterattack. As one man the battalion rushed after him and with their bayonets they hurled the Germans back.

The Germans sent a second battalion. A second bayonet attack followed, with the same result. The Germans could not make up their minds to attack again, called out their artillery, and began to bombard the battalion. Uninterrupted artillery fire went on for forty-eight hours. The battalion sustained heavy losses, for it had no entrenching tools, but it held out until the end, when the order came to fall back.

"I can understand everything," Bleysh told me later. "I can understand that the shock-troopers, once they had made up their minds to accomplish something heroic, were able to withstand such heavy losses and thus hold their position. I can understand the fact that not even one of them asked me why I wasn't retreating, but I can't understand why not a single shock-trooper asked me why I wasn't feeding them for two whole days."

We did not have any field-kitchens or bread supply or even water.

On the third day, the battalion withdrew, according to orders. Four hundred men had remained out of twelve hundred. The casualties amounted to sixty-six percent. But the break-through by the Germans had been closed. Upon the recommendation of the corps commander, General Kornilov issued a telegraphic order that all of the survivors were to be awarded the Cross of St. George. This was the only occurrence of its kind in the history of that period.

I reviewed the battalion a few days later. It was a battalion of heroes. They looked with pride at Colonel Bleysh, their commanding officer. In the Volunteer Army, Bleysh later became the commander of one of the best officer regiments, the Markovsky Regiment, subsequently the Markovsky Division, and he died of wounds received in Novorossiisk in 1920.

The third shock-battalion, led by Captain Ott, was sent to Volochisk. This was a road junction in the rear of the army. Three days later, Captain Ott reported "I have organized six battalions of former deserters. More deserters are coming in by very round-about routes." In the end no battles were fought there.

The fourth battalion was composed of cadets under the command of Lieutenant Popov, who was also disabled, having only one arm. By the time the battalion had arrived at Proskurov, an important road junction on the left flank of the front, there were no longer any

civil authorities there. The city itself was crammed full of soldiers fleeing from their units.

After he had established order, Lieutenant Popov proceeded to round up deserters. On the very first day, four battalions were formed, which I reviewed a day later. The soldiers stood at attention, said they were satisfied, and asked to be accepted as shock-troopers. This was an extremely significant incident. People had grown weary of disorder and confusion and wanted a firm guiding hand. But we had neither the means nor the time to retrain such an enormous number of men with whom we were totally unfamiliar.

A few days later, Lieutenant Popov was summoned by the commanding officer of the combat engineers, who asked him to restore order among 20,000 civilian workers, who had refused to dig trenches for the second line of the front and were threatening the engineers with lynching. Popov took a platoon of cadets and two machine-guns and rode out to the work site on a truck. There stood a huge crowd of striking workers. Driving directly into the midst of the crowd, Popov unloaded the machine-guns, lined up the platoon with their rifles ready, and, turning to the crowd, demanded that the instigators be handed over to him. He set a time limit of three minutes for the surrender and then, taking out his watch, started to study the minute hand.

During the course of the first minute, he ordered the cadets to bring feed-belts up to the machine-guns and to check the breech-blocks. During the course of the second minute, he ordered them to aim at the crowd, and he started to count out loud "Fifty seconds left, forty . . . , thirty . . . , twenty . . . , ten. . . ."

The crowd stirred and, before the end of the third minute, thirteen men were pushed out from its ranks. We were lucky with number thirteen. It was the same number as that of the looters executed at Tarnopol. Popov greeted these thirteen men by saying: "Aha! My dear comrades! Very happy to see you! You're just the ones I needed! So you think that our army is defeated and that it doesn't need any trenches at all? There's nothing else I can do. I have to hand you over to be court-martialled!"

Paper and a table covered with green felt had been brought along from Proskurov. The court, composed of three cadets, proceeded to examine the case on the spot, before the very eyes of the crowd. In a few moments the presiding judge announced "The case is clear. All thirteen men are guilty. All thirteen are sentenced to be shot!"

Popov ordered the condemned men to be given shovels and then

commanded them to dig graves for themselves with their own hands. The crowd watched in silence. No one stirred. The effect was overwhelming. Eleven of the condemned men fell on their knees and begged for mercy, pointing out that they were not guilty and that they had been talked into it. They said that they had not known what they were doing and that the whole affair had been started by two ringleaders. They then pointed out which of the group had been the ringleaders. These latter proved to be the chairman and vice-chairman of the Bolshevik Party's Military Revolutionary Committee of the Front. Popov pardoned the eleven men and ordered the other two to be shot. The crowd made room for the shooting. When the cadets passed by the newly dug graves at parade march, the crowd as one man kneeled and promised to be obedient and not to act contrary to the orders of the military authorities.

Thus General Kornilov's command to restore order and discipline on the front lines of the demoralized armies was carried out. The effect of these initial actions by the shock-battalions was overwhelming. The news of the executions spread over the front like wildfire, and, along the entire front, soldiers who only yesterday had been killing their officers, started to salute all officers. This was a phenomenon totally unheard of since the issuance of Order No. 1. The psychological moment for restoring the front was at hand. Unfortunately, there was no longer any civil authority to clinch the matter.

By order of General Kornilov, I assumed command of a regiment composed of about three thousand volunteers, unorganized, untrained, and unclothed, together with a very small number of officers who had just completed their training at a school for second lieutenants. At this time, front headquarters had already begun the retreat from Kamenets-Podolsk, which the Germans were approaching. I marched my men right up to the quartermaster depot, which had already been abandoned by army headquarters. My regiment got its uniforms. We obtained officers from a number of those who had stayed on in the city after headquarters had left. We found it possible to start whipping the regiment into shape. My assistant was Lieutenant-Colonel Tsybikin, the supply officer was Captain Zavadsky, and Second Lieutenant Lapin was the adjutant.

As was standard procedure after the Revolution, the shock-battalions, like all other units of the army, had their own company

and battalion committees. The difference lay in the fact that the committees of the shock-battalions did not work against their commanding officers but supported the authority of the officers and saw to the maintenance of discipline. In my regiment, too, there was a regimental committee, which supported me in the matter of training the volunteers. I never attended the meetings of the committee, but its chairman would come to me every evening and ask how the committee could be of service in maintaining order and discipline. There was no instance whatsoever in which we ever disagreed on anything.

My regiment was attached to Seventh Army Headquarters. I received an order to camp in a certain forest. There we continued training and setting up the facilities of the camp.

Once, the committee reported to me that a certain soldier was stirring up the volunteers and criticizing my orders as commanding officer. I assembled the regiment under arms and said that such conduct on the part of one man was casting a shadow upon the entire regiment and upon every one of us who had entered the ranks of the shock-troopers in the name of service to the ideal of our country. The character in question answered me back while standing in formation, exactly as was the custom in demoralized units of the army. I felt something like a wave of resistance to me on the part of the massed men, but I immediately met this wave head on by sharply calling to the speaker to step out in front of the assembled regiment. He came forward with his rifle. Both of us stood in front of the regiment; both aware that the regiment was looking at me and waiting for my decision. What was I going to do? I ripped off his epaulettes and his shock-trooper insignia and called forward all the members of the committees to try this man who had committed the offense immediately, right then and there before the assembled regiment. The members of the committees came forward, gathered together, and began deliberations.

I gave the regiment the order to stand at rest, and we waited. In fifteen minutes, the chairman of the regimental committee reported to me that the combined committees of the regiment and the battalions had unanimously decided that the volunteer in question be expelled from the regiment without the right of enlisting in any other shock-units, and that he be deprived of the title of shock-trooper. This was the severest measure of punishment in the shock-battalions. The guilty man was at once expelled from the regimental

encampment under a hail of condemnatory yells on the part of all the volunteers.

Discipline was restored in the regiment and never again did even a single volunteer manifest insubordination or criticism. I felt that I had won the psychological trust and support of the regiment and that the entire unit, as one man, felt itself to be together with me in spirit. For the commanding officer of an outfit in time of war there can be no greater happiness than to be in command of such a unit. It was a phenomenon that was completely incomprehensible and marvellous in view of the atmosphere of total demoralization in the units surrounding us. The shock-troopers were truly the last bearers of the finest feelings and traditions of honor of the Russian army, at a time when its existence was coming to an end.

In August, the regiment was sent to a position in the most threatened sector of the front, in the village of Yezhezisk, north of Gusyatin, in Galicia, where the German lines had come closest to our positions. After inspecting the position, I decided to attack the Germans. This was in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the shock-troopers.

That very same night, one battalion of the regiment launched a bayonet attack, without firing a shot. By morning, the Germans had been driven out of the forest, which was located far forward of their main line; and as a result of this, they fell back to their second line over a sector almost twenty kilometers wide.

We had only a few killed or wounded. The prestige of the regiment suddenly rose among the neighboring units. It was still dangerous, however, for shock-troopers to venture out alone from the area of the regimental encampment.

A few days later, the commanding officer of the Seventh Army ordered our regiment to assign details to carry out raids along the front of all the army divisions, because the soldiers of these divisions were refusing to leave their trenches.

I sent my detail of regimental scouts, under the command of Second Lieutenant Pavlov, who had been wounded eleven times, to the front of the neighboring division. In front of the positions lay the Austrian city of Gusyatin, which had been captured by the Germans. It was impossible to approach this city in the daytime, but just because of this Pavlov decided to attack in the daytime, before the eyes of the whole division.

At 11 o'clock in the morning, fifty scouts moved to the attack

across a small stream. The Germans, who for months had not seen a single Russian unit that was advancing, held their fire. The scouts entered the city in full view and, going up to the German units, fell upon them with hand grenades. The Germans, who were not expecting an attack, started to fall back, but when they saw that no one was moving behind the scouts, they moved up their battalion reserves and proceeded to counter-attack.

For four hours, a hand-grenade battle went on among the houses of the city. The shock-troopers were surrounded and had to fight their way out. The casualties were two killed and a few wounded. One mortally wounded shock-trooper, Ivashin by name, was carried out of the battle and died in my arms. His last words were, "Colonel, sir, tell my mother that her son died for the honor of Russia's name." I passed these words around throughout the regiment, in an order, and I sent this order to his mother.

Other groups found their way into divisions which were already completely demoralized. Once, when one of these groups went out at night on a raid against the Germans, our own men opened fire on them from the rear. The scouts had to keep taking cover from fire aimed at them from both the front and the rear. Nevertheless, the raid was carried out.

A third group was arrested by the soldiers of its own division before it could go out on a raid, because, in the opinion of these soldiers, activity along the front was provoking German fire. I rode out to the sector personally and had to go through a great deal of trouble to save my men from being lynched by the surrounding soldiers.

In a fourth division, only my battalion was called out to disarm a regiment which had on the previous day killed its commanding officer. After a few initial shots, the regiment laid down its arms.

These operations provoked an attitude of hostility towards us on the part of all the units of the Army which did not desire any military operations whatsoever. The demoralization of the Army continued apace and events in the rear were coming to a head.

At the end of August, I sent two officers to *stavka* (headquarters) with a proposal that shock-battalions be concentrated in that vicinity in the form of a shock-army. This was the time that Kornilov was preparing a march on Petrograd in order to disperse the Soviet of Soldiers and Workers' Deputies. The Provisional Government, with a force of three Cossack regiments, had just crushed the Communists' first uprising to seize power, and Kerensky was conducting

negotiations with Kornilov with regard to moving reliable units to Petrograd. Next in order stood the question of the liquidation of Bolshevism. Our battalions were as though made to order for this task, for they had not been exposed to Communist propaganda and constituted loyal and closely-knit infantry units which had been carrying out all the orders of their superiors.

General Kornilov, however, was afraid to leave the front without any shock units and could not make up his mind to take this step. He summoned to *stavka* only his own, the Kornilov, Shock-Regiment and the Omsk Death Battalion, which belonged to my regiment, but, unable to make up his mind to send even these to Petrograd, he entrusted the task, instead, to the cavalry. At the decisive moment on which the fate of Russia depended, the only troops that were moved to Petrograd were General Krymov's cavalry corps and General Krasnov's Cossack units. Subsequent events are well known. Kerensky, who had himself thought up this march, suddenly changed his mind, and, declaring Kornilov to be a traitor, swerved around to the Petrograd Soviet. Provocateurs, sent by the Bolsheviks, demoralized Krymov's corps. As for Krymov himself, he had a talk with Kerensky and then shot himself. Nothing came of the entire undertaking. I am certain that this would not have occurred if the shock-troopers had been used. But we were not given this opportunity.

In October, my regiment was located in a position facing the Austrian city of Gorodok, on the left flank of the Seventh Army. I had been ordered to attack Gorodok and had already carried out reconnaissance and issued all the orders necessary for an attack at dawn. Deserters from the Austrian side informed me that a Czech regiment was waiting for the attack in order to come over to our side.

At eleven o'clock in the evening, I received a telegram in which General Dukhonin, acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, summoned me to take my regiment to Mogilev, in order to guard *stavka*. At dawn, after calling off the attack, I set out with my regiment to entrain for *stavka*. In breaking through the demoralized armies of the southwestern front by force of arms, our regiment lost two battalions, which were cut off by a railroad strike, and it arrived in Mogilev at the beginning of November, after the Bolsheviks had already seized power in Petrograd.

We found *stavka* in its death throes. There were generals and other officers there, but there was not even a single military unit which

could be relied upon or which was carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Intskirveli, the Commandant of *stavka*, and General Bonch-Bruevich, the garrison commander, had gone over to the side of the Bolsheviks.

We were in an enemy camp. In order to raise morale and to put on a demonstration, I ordered that patrols be sent around through the city and that the shock-troopers salute their officers by standing at attention. Such a scene had been unknown since the beginning of the Revolution. The officers of *stavka* took heart at the sight of the shock-troopers. No one knew how many of us there were. The Bolsheviks became frightened, and all the time there were only three hundred of us.

At this time, my committee reported to me that it had received an invitation to a meeting at the garrison Commander's. I said, "Go ahead." I did not issue any instructions, for the shock-troopers themselves knew what to do. Our regiment, although reduced to the strength of only one battalion, was one closely-knit family, surrounded by enemies, and in imminent danger. But not one of them had any doubts or hesitations.

That night, my delegates returned from the meeting and reported that General Bonch-Bruevich had proposed that the units of the garrison form a military-revolutionary committee of *stavka*, a procedure usually followed by the Bolsheviks for the purpose of seizing power. Whereupon our delegates asked him if he knew that this was a Bolshevik title. The General, who had not expected such a question, began to justify himself, saying that we were all military people and that this was a post-revolutionary period, and that the title was completely innocuous.

To this the shock-troopers replied, "General, don't try to wriggle out of it. We understood you perfectly. Now we want you to know that in the event that a committee is formed, we'll destroy both you and the committee." The General became disconcerted, for he had not supposed that soldiers could teach a general his duty of honor to his country. The delegates of the other units had become silent. The attempt to form a military-revolutionary committee of *stavka* was broken off.

That same night, the shock-troopers requested my permission to liquidate the General, who had forgotten his honor. I turned down this proposal, for we had more important tasks to carry out.

The next day, I received an invitation from General Wrangel, who was in *stavka*, to visit him in his railroad car with a delegation

of shock-troopers. This meeting was attended by our central committee and also by delegates of the shock-battalions and death-units of the western and northern fronts, who happened to be in *stavka*.

General Wrangel said to us: "I have invited you here, gentlemen, in order to inform you that I have submitted a report to the Commander-in-Chief containing a project for re-organizing the Russian Army on a volunteer basis, like your battalions, for the purpose of restoring the Russian front, even if it is on the Volga. I request your support for this project."

I answered in the name of those present: "That fits in perfectly with the ideas of our battalions and we can only welcome your initiative. Go to it, General, our hearts are with you."

The General thanked us and we left. That same day, he went to Petrograd, but . . . the opportunity had already been missed.

After that, I took steps to concentrate the shock-battalions at *stavka*. At my request, headquarters summoned to Mogilev the Second Orenburg Battalion, commanded by Bleysh, the hero of Trembovlya. During that same period, the shock-battalions of Captains Blinov and Kurochkin, of the western front, and of Lieutenant Voinov, of the northern front, came to *stavka* on their own initiative. The first two had fought their way through from Minsk, where, in capturing an armored train, they had lost almost half their men. They all reported that they had fought their way through to us because they had heard that shock-troopers were assembling near *stavka*. I took these battalions under my command.

A day later, I met Colonel Bakhtin, commanding officer of the shock-battalion of the First Finnish Division, which was passing by Mogilev. I explained the situation to him and suggested that he join forces with us. On the same day, his battalion came to Mogilev and reported that it had come to help defend *stavka*.

Headquarters (Colonel Kusonsky) summoned me and asked on what grounds I was assembling the shock-battalions. I replied: "Inasmuch as our superiors have lost the capacity to run things, we are assembling on our own accord, for the defense of *stavka*. In order to act against the Communists, we must operate with the same measures that they employ, and we must fear nothing." Kusonsky was unable to raise any objections.

At this point, we already had more than two thousand shock-troopers, and the Bolsheviks had to reckon with us.

A few days later, I was informed that General Dukhonin was

calling a meeting of the ranking personnel of *stavka*. This meeting was attended by the commanding officers of the battalions and by the delegates of other shock-units. A crowd of Bolshevik supporters had gathered in a large room at headquarters. A second lieutenant was chairman. We waited. General Dukhonin came in and excitedly informed us that he had received a telegram to the effect that the Allies were permitting him to conclude a separate peace with the Germans, in order to save the Russian Army. His question was, could he count on the support of the ranking personnel of *stavka*.

I then spoke out in the name of the shock-troopers and said that two thousand shock-troopers were awaiting the orders of their Commander-in-Chief. "No one and nothing can stop us," I said, "and if anyone has any doubts on that score, let him try. We'll show him what it means to try to stop us. We request orders!"

After me, the representatives of the battalions repeated the same threat. The crowd remained silent. The Bolsheviks are brave only where they can kill with impunity, where they outnumber their opponents by at least ten to one. But it was dangerous to try anything with the shock-battalions. This was the first open manifestation against the Communists.

General Dukhonin showed indecision. He said to us: "Thank you. Your proposal is honorable and noble. But I don't want blood to be shed on my account. Our country will still have need of you alive." And he went out. We left after him.

Under the pressure of an almost hopeless situation, Dukhonin lost his will and backed out of the fight. The shock-troopers were no longer needed by their Commander-in-Chief. But it was impossible for us to reconcile ourselves to this.

We were notified that the Finnish division, located to the north of Mogilev, had set up batteries in order to shell the city. That night, however, I rode out with some shock-troopers on two trucks and removed the breech-blocks from their heavy weapons, which were actually standing in position. The crew manning the weapons did not put up any resistance.

The next day, I was informed that Ensign Krylenko, who had been named the new Commander-in-Chief by the Soviets, was advancing upon Mogilev with groups of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and that he was already in Orsha, six hours away. I took a detail of scouts and rode out towards him on two locomotives in order to blow up the bridges. At the first station, however, I received a telephone call from *stavka*. It was again Colonel Kusonsky talking:

"What are you doing, Colonel? The Commander-in-Chief has ordered you to return at once and has forbidden you to blow up the bridges!" I submitted, for I could not refuse to obey the Commander-in-Chief.

When I returned to headquarters, I was told that General Dukhonin had decided to turn over his command to Krylenko. Naturally, he could not destroy the bridges in front of him. The situation was becoming absurd. We had come to defend *stavka*, but *stavka* itself did not want to be defended. We had nothing further to do in Mogilev.

At this time, I found out that Bleysh's battalion had arrived in Zhlobin. I called Bleysh up on the telephone and after making sure whom I was talking with, I said, "Don't believe anybody. Deceit and treachery are all around. Leave your battalion in Zhlobin and tear up the tracks on the railroad branch to Minsk, where the armored trains are coming from. You yourself take a locomotive and come to Mogilev."

When Bleysh arrived, we discussed the situation, and I sent a telegram: "To Ensign Krylenko, Orsha. In the event that you come to Mogilev, you and everybody with you will be shot at the railroad station," and I signed my name. I remember this telegram verbatim. It is not every day that one has the opportunity of sending such a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of a Communist army. Two hours later, I received an answer, "To Colonel Manakin, Mogilev. In order to avoid needless bloodshed, not a single Communist will set foot in Mogilev, as long as even one shock-trooper is there. Military-Revolutionary Committee, Orsha."

Thus, we had gained some time. Unfortunately, the situation in *stavka* became confused. As a matter of fact, we received an order, on the very same day, to leave Mogilev. We asked to be sent to the Caucasus, because at that time, the Cossacks were starting an uprising on the Don. I began to organize a shock-detachment. Inasmuch as I was not the highest in rank, I invited General Yankevsky to take over the post of commanding officer of the detachment, and I myself assumed the post of chief of staff.

At the station, I requested rolling stock for two thousand men and I also requested baggage cars. I was answered that there were no cars. I said, "Send an inquiry to Orsha!" Two hours later, we were given five trains with complete equipment. This was a miracle in those days of complete disorder. We started entraining. The Finnish battalion went first, then came others, and my battalion

came last. When the greater part of my battalion had left and only one group remained at the railroad station, I took two scouts and went to the headquarters. When the guard at the entrance saw the commanding officer of the shock-regiment, he did not know what to do. I ordered the gate to be opened and I entered the courtyard.

Opposite the Commander-in-Chief's room, I caught sight of Colonel Odintsov, who had conducted the negotiations with Krylenko with regard to the surrender of *stavka*. From him I learned that Krylenko was observing our truce terms "honorably" and that he was waiting for the departure of the last shock-troopers.

I left a scout in the corridor and entered the room. General Dukhonin was alone. I said, "General, you have nothing further to do here. My automobile is standing at the entrance, and at the railroad station my squad is waiting for me. No one will dare to stop us. We'll take you wherever you can commence the formation of a new Russian army free of Communists. Let's go!"

General Dukhonin looked at me in hopeless dejection and said, "I can't answer you." He then covered his face with his hands and said, "It's so horrible to be a lump of flesh," and he went out. He had a foreboding of his own death, but he thought his duty was to stay at his post.

General Dideriks, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, came out of a neighboring room. The talk I had with him was so interesting that I remember it in full. He asked me what the nature of my proposal was, that General Dukhonin should go along with us as the Commander-in-Chief or as an ordinary general. I replied that as an officer of the Russian army I had only to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but since there were no longer any units here to which he could issue orders, there was no sense at all in staying behind, to meet certain death. I was therefore inviting General Dukhonin to leave with the shock-troopers.

General Dideriks answered: "General Dukhonin as a general can go with you, but as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, he cannot leave his post. Do you really think that we didn't consider this matter? Only yesterday the General and I were in a private apartment, in civilian clothes. We looked at each other, became ashamed, and returned to headquarters."

I realized that General Dideriks was the one that was standing over Dukhonin like Fate, prompting him with the idea of sacrificing himself. The question was, why? It was a beautiful idea but a use-

less death. And I said, "And how do you picture the future, General?"

"Your venture is hopeless," he replied. "You will perish. Communism is a elemental force against which it is impossible to fight right now. It has to rush throughout all of Russia, sweeping away everything in its path. It is hopeless to oppose it."

"In other words, you're folding your arms and doing nothing?"

"No, when the first wave has passed by, we shall rise up and renew the battle!"

"I wish you success in your plan," I said, "but it doesn't suit us shock-troopers. We'll fight here and now!"

(To be continued)

The Revolutions of 1848: Soviet Revised Version*

BY SIDNEY HARCAVE

THE historian might be considered fortunate among Soviet scholars because he has at hand the accepted—and, to his chief critics, the infallible—key to history: Marxism. In dealing with the revolutions of 1848, he might be considered doubly fortunate since he has, as guides to his treatment of that period, not only the general historical method of Marx, but also the master's extensive analysis of the events of 1848. However, in trying to take advantage of this double blessing in recent years, he seems to have found himself embarrassingly involved in difficulties growing out of the requirement that he profess Marxism and, at the same time, follow Stalinism.

Up to the time that the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S.S.R. began to show signs of divergence from the views of Marx, the historian could safely guide himself by the chief Marxian pointers of 1848: (1) that the revolutions marked an important step in the development of capitalistic society, being an outgrowth of efforts on the part of the bourgeoisie of western and central Europe to enhance their political power in order to consolidate their economic position; (2) that they marked the introduction of the proletariat as a political factor. On the basis of those two pointers, Marx's Soviet disciples spelled out many lessons for future political action, particularly in revolutionary situations.¹

Marx, along with Engels, argued that the events of 1848 represented the forces of history working in pre-determined directions and that the proper tactic of the participants was to aid, not to hinder, those forces. By his reasoning, unification of the German states was a requisite of history, and those who hindered that unification were counter-revolutionaries. With respect to the people of the Hapsburg Empire, he found only the Germans, Poles, and Magyars to be worthy of continued existence as ethnic groups, while the lot of the Czechs and Southern Slavs was simply "to perish in the

*This article is based on a speech given at a meeting of the New York State Association of European Historians [Ed.].

¹Cf. Y. M. Zakher, *Revolutsiya 1848 g. v Germanii* Leningrad, 1931.

revolutionary holocaust."² The Slavs in general (he was willing to except the Poles, Russians, and possibly the Turkish Slavs) were the "ethnic trash" of history, whose efforts to stay the forces of history made them counter-revolutionary; they were doomed to die. The Czechs, in particular, roused his anger. Their homeland, Bohemia, had no future except "as a portion of Germany. . . ."³ The Czech leader Palacky was "nothing but a learned German run mad,"⁴ a fanatic who could not even speak Czech correctly. For the Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848, Marx had nothing but abuse. All in all, Pan-Slavism was a "ludicrous . . . anti-historical movement . . . a movement which intended nothing less than to subjugate the civilized West under the barbarian East. . . ."⁵ And behind the Slavs' national movements (except that of the Poles), there was the menace of Russian Tsarism, the chief enemy of the revolutionary movement.

Such sentiments proved rather strong medicine for some Marxists to swallow. The German socialist Karl Kautsky, for example, felt impelled to apologize for Marx's attack on the Czechs.⁶ On the other hand, the Russian Communists, Slavs though they were, took their medicine for a full generation without a murmur. Lenin summed up and denounced the national movements of the Czechs and Southern Slavs in 1848 as stirrings in the "outposts of Russian Tsarism."⁷ He interpreted Marx to mean that, in a conflict of interests between the national-liberation movements of larger nationalities such as the Germans, Poles, and Magyars, and those of smaller peoples such as the Czechs and Southern Slavs, number and right were directly proportional. The historian Seleznev hailed Marx's analysis of the rôle of the Southern Slavs as brilliant and denied that the Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs had any existence as nationalities in 1848.⁸

So it went, with slight variation, up to the middle thirties. Then

²Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1952, p. 59.

³Karl Marx, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1912, p. 90.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶Cf. his introduction to Karl Marx, *Revolution und Kontre-Revolution in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1920, p. xxi.

⁷V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Leningrad, 1935, Vol. XIX, p. 257.

⁸K. Seleznev, "Yuzhnoslavyanskíe narody v revolyutsii 1848 goda," *Borba Klassov*, October, 1936, p. 50.

there began a perceptible shift along certain official lines in the Soviet scheme, and Soviet historians, who were required to give first call to the needs of the state and second to Marx, found themselves faced with the necessity of re-interpreting their subject matter in such a way as to accommodate the changing position.

Various factors were involved in the shift, but the difficulties for the historians arose from the general outcome: the transcendence of Soviet nationalism over proletarian internationalism. The changed emphasis resulted in the posthumous disavowal of Pokrovsky, who had been, until his death, the historical Mohammed to Marx; now he and his followers were accused of disarming the Russian people morally by destroying "all belief in Russia, all patriotism, all respect and love for its great past."⁹ The new dispensation required the study and glorification of national history. Even outside the Soviet Union, Communists were transformed—temporarily, at least—into patriots: Earl Browder spoke of Communism as "twentieth-century Americanism"; and the French Communist Jacques Duclos declared the Communists to be the heirs of the best traditions of France, the custodians of the glories of Descartes and Voltaire.

As far as the study of the revolutions of 1848 was concerned, the shift to nationalism did not immediately affect it; as late as 1939 Soviet historians were doing little more than writing a précis of Marx when they dealt with 1848.¹⁰ But the way for re-interpretation was being prepared.

It remained for World War II to supply the conditions under which re-interpretation finally took place. The war returned Russia to the position of a great power with specific interests in the territories which had been affected by the revolutions of 1848, and her foreign policy began to favor the existence of separate national states in central and southern Europe. Therefore it became necessary to prove that the struggles of the Czechs and Southern Slavs in 1848, while perhaps badly led, had been historically correct in their long-range aspirations. And now that Soviet Russia was the "friend" and "protector" of other Slavic peoples, it was desirable to re-assess the relations of Tsarist Russia to the Slavic national movements of 1848. Tsarist Russia was still a sow's ear, but perhaps a few silken threads might be found among the bristles.

⁹E. V. Tarle, "Soviet Historical Research," *Science and Society*, Summer, 1943, p. 230.

¹⁰Cf. E. V. Tarle, A. V. Yefimov and F. A. Kheifetz (eds.), *Novaya Istoriya*, Moscow, 1939, Pt. 1, pp. 300-368.

These new interests of Russia and the old interpretation of Marx were at odds on many points; something had to be done about the situation. And something has been done. Not that there has been any admitted revision of Marx. His works are as infallible in the Soviet Union today as they were a generation ago; but the emphases have been changed. It is as if a photographer had changed the focus of his lens, dimmed certain lights and turned up others so that, though the subject remained unchanged, the finished photograph showed it with certain features accented, others subdued. In short, a new interpretation has been achieved, one which can be defended on the ground of artistic (read Communist) license.

The feat of denying Marx covertly while appearing to affirm him overtly has been brought off by omission and distortion. There had long been an unwritten rule in Soviet scholarship that the Marxian classics should be quoted wherever the slightest degree of relevance to the subject at hand could be demonstrated. To flout the rule was to court attacks by academic and party snipers. But, in recent years, the rule has been waived when the words of the master and his disciples might prove embarrassing to the Kremlin. Shuster, for example, in writing about the revolution of 1848 in Poznan achieved the distinction of not citing a single relevant item from Marx.¹¹ In the thirties, an article on the same subject would have provoked criticism if it had not mentioned Marx at least a dozen times. Now, complete omission seems to be the rule when nothing in the sacred writings can be found to support the desired interpretation. But if some safe statement can be found, it is cited; it may even be used to support conclusions which Marx denied. Thus Udaltsov points out that most Germans opposed the Czech revolt in Prague but that Marx and Engels supported it, at least in its first phase, when it aided the general revolutionary forces. Then, having saluted them, he proceeds to argue in affirmation of the Czech national movement, implicitly denying the Marxian interpretation.¹² But in no instance does a Soviet historian admit that Marx might have erred. Only the heterodox err.

As might be expected, one of the most striking changes in interpretation is that relating to the rôle of the Slavs in 1848. Where

¹¹U. Shuster, "Poznanskoe vosstanie 1848 goda," *Voprosy Istorii*, March, 1948, pp. 16-39.

¹²I. Udaltsov, "K voprosu o revolyutsionnom dvizhenii v Chekhii v 1848 godu," *Voprosy Istorii*, May, 1947, p. 42. Cf. his "K kharakteristike politicheskoi deyatel'nosti Frantishka Palatskogo," *Voprosy Istorii*, October, 1950, pp. 72-85.

Marx saw evil in the Slav movement, contemporary Soviet historians see evil too; but they try to find, in addition, some good where he saw none. While he took obvious delight in his attacks on the Slavs, they try to show tolerance for or to explain away the admitted sins. In essence, the new interpretation denies the older one by defending the national aspirations of all Slavic nationalities, by attacking "the pretensions of the Frankfurt Parliament to include Slav lands in the German empire,"¹³ and by denying a close tie between St. Petersburg and the Slavic national movements.¹⁴ The rebel Slavs are still chided for failing to realize that a revolutionary war against Tsarist Russia was then required and for opposing the German and Hungarian revolutions when they did, but they are no longer taken to task for not committing national suicide.¹⁵

Illustrative of the new interpretation is Udaltsov's treatment of the Slav Congress in Prague. Whereas to Marx it was a ridiculous assembly foredoomed to failure, to Udaltsov it appears as a positive event since it was a part of the Slav movement. Thus, if the congress supported the opponents of the German and Hungarian revolutions, the fault lay, at least in part, with "the anti-Slav policies of the German and Hungarian bourgeoisie. . . ."¹⁶ Where Marx saw the sinister shadow of St. Petersburg, Udaltsov sees that of Vienna. It was not Russian Pan-Slavism which was in the minds of the leaders of the congress but Austro-Slavism; they wanted national rights for the Austrian Slavs within the Hapsburg Empire, not federation with Russia.

In adopting a pro-Slav position, Soviet historians, of necessity, now fall into an anti-German and pro-Klein Deutsch position, whereas Marx held to a pro-German position—and a Gross Deutsch one at that. He wanted a Germany which would include Austria,

¹³I. Udaltsov, "Iz istorii slavyanskogo s'ezda v Prage v 1848 godu," *Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Slavyanovedeniya*, 1949, Vol. I, p. 83.

¹⁴I. Udaltsov, "Natsionalnaya i revolyutsionnaya borba v Chekhii v 1848 g.," *Revolutsii 1848-1849* (F. V. Potemkin and A. I. Molok, eds.), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1952, Vol. I, p. 381.

¹⁵Cf. A. Z. Baraboi, "Pravoberezhnaya Ukraina v 1848 g.," *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, 1950, XXXIV, pp. 86-121; I. S. Miller, "Nakanune otmeny barshchiny v Galitsii," *Uchenye Zapiski*, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 119-240; S. A. Nikitin, "K voprosu o politicheskom dvizhenii Serbov Voevodiny v 1848 godu," *Uchenye Zapiski*, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 85-118; S. A. Nikitin, "Slavyanskije narody v revolyutsii 1848 goda," *Voprosy Istorii*, July, 1948, pp. 27-43.

¹⁶I. Udaltsov, "Iz istorii slavyanskogo s'ezda v Prage v 1848 godu," *Uchenye Zapiski*, 1949, Vol. I, p. 83.

Bohemia, and Prussian Poland (although, for tactical reasons, he was prepared to concede Prussian Poland to the Poles); but the Kremlin, needless to say, does not see eye-to-eye with him on that point just now. To support the current view without contravening the infallibility of Marx, the historians must utilize somewhat round-about methods. Since Moscow, for strategic reasons, favors a separate Austria, they quietly ignore Marx on that subject while vociferously denouncing as Hitlerites and Anglo-American imperialists all those who now hold the view that Austria has historically been a part of Germany.¹⁷ They by-pass the Marxian views on Bohemia but take Professor Rothfels to task for denying the tendency of the Frankfurt Parliament to "enslave and Germanize not only the Czechs but also the Poles of Poznan. . . ."¹⁸ And, despite the fact that Marx found Prussian Poland so Germanized that it should properly be included in Germany, Soviet scholars—Shuster, for example—now find Poznan to have been at least seventy percent Polish.¹⁹

Another point on which the father of dialectical materialism must be diplomatically handled is that concerning Tsarist Russia's relation to the forces of revolution in 1848. Marx saw Russia as the supreme foe of revolution at that time and, following him, Soviet historians for many years reveled in attacks on the policies and actions of the "gendarme of Europe," their sharpest assaults being directed against Russian intervention in the Hungarian revolution. Recent Soviet studies have not attempted to reverse the earlier verdict, but they have attempted to soften it. They give less space to denunciation of Russian iniquities than was given in the past and more space to denunciation of foreigners who are judged too severe in their attacks or who draw anti-Soviet lessons from Russian conduct in 1848. The German writer Stadelmann is now categorized as an imperialist lackey for asserting that only Russia opposed German unification while England and France favored it. Professor Rothfels is lambasted for seeing the necessity, both in 1848 and in 1948, for a *Mittleuropa* based on German and non-Russian Slavs as a bulwark against Russia.²⁰ No Soviet historian has yet found that Tsarist

¹⁷R. Averbukh, "Eva Priester. Kurze Geschichte Österreichs," (book review) *Voprosy Istorii*, September, 1950, p. 150.

¹⁸S. Kan, "Stoletnii yubilei revolyutsii 1848 g. v nemetskoj istoricheskoi literature," *Voprosy Istorii*, November, 1950, p. 138.

¹⁹Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁰Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

Russia deliberately helped the forces of revolution; but Miss Melnikova, for one, derives some comfort from the fact that the presence of the Russian army of intervention in Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1849 inadvertently helped to rouse the national consciousness of the Ukrainian inhabitants.²¹ And she, as well as others, attacks the Hungarian leaders for their attitude toward Slavic minorities.

Perhaps the most far-reaching change in the Soviet assessment of 1848 is to be found in a greater official appreciation of the forces of nationalism. For Marx, the national movements were simply by-products of the growth of the bourgeoisie, who wanted national unification in order to gain political power and to extend the free market. Although he approved of what he considered to be the progressive aspects of some of the national movements, he had little patience with national aspirations as such (unless they were German) and little appreciation of the meaning of nationalism as a historical phenomenon. Stalin was thinking as a Marxist when he wrote, in 1913, that the national movement "in its essence is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is chiefly favorable to and suitable for the bourgeoisie."²² Soviet historians took their cue from him and, until the recent war, treated the national movements of 1848 (except those of the Germans, Hungarians, and Poles) with little sympathy or ignored them altogether. One instance: in a chapter on the history of Italy from 1815 to 1849, the historian Yefimov did not once use the term *Risorgimento* nor deal with Italian nationalism at all except as a "movement of the liberal bourgeoisie for unification. . . ."²³

By now the earlier writers have either conveniently seen the errors in their treatment of that aspect of 1848 or found themselves relegated to the limbo of heretics and officially forgotten; and later works give considerable prominence to national movements, not only those of the Slavs but also those of non-Slavic peoples. To continue the example of their treatment of the Italian national movement: in a post-war article in the chief Soviet historical journal, it is stated that only Italian and Soviet Communist historians are capable of a proper treatment of the Italian revolution of 1848, and it is implied that the *Risorgimento* is part of the tradition of the

²¹I. Melnikova, "Zakarpatskaya Ukraina v revolyutsii 1848 goda," *Voprosy Istorii*, August, 1949, p. 86. See also her, "Zakarpatskaya Ukraina v revolyutsii 1848 goda," *Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Slavyanovedeniya*, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 241-292.

²²Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, New York, International Publishers, n.d., p. 17.

²³*Novaya Istoriya*, p. 361.

Italian proletariat.²⁴ It is doubtful that the Communists, like the Fascists, will claim the *Risorgimento* as their own, but at least they no longer overlook the historical fact of its having taken place. This Soviet recognition of the national movements of 1848 is not necessarily an acceptance of nationalism as an independent historical force but rather a grudging acknowledgment of the power of nationalism, a power which the U.S.S.R. seeks to harness for its own purposes. There is ample evidence that, in Soviet circles, nationalism is still considered an alien force.

After recognizing all these changes, one may well ask what is left of the older Soviet Marxist version of 1848. The answer is that a great deal is left. The analysis of 1848 remains basically the same: the revolutions are still interpreted as an important step in the development of capitalist society, the purpose of which was to enhance the political and economic power of the bourgeoisie; and the year 1848 is still regarded as the beginning of the struggle of the nascent proletariat for power, the beginning of the movement the end of which will be world Communism.²⁵ In short, Marx has been revised in detail but not in substance.

From the Soviet point of view of historiography, the revision has profited Soviet historians by unshackling them from the rigorous acceptance of every jot and tittle of the Marxian canon and by permitting them greater scope for historical research than had previously been possible. Yet, in the revised version of their work on the revolutions of 1848, they have not deleted the name of Marx from the dedication page; they have simply added the name of Stalin.

²⁴K. Miziano, "Godovshchina revolyutsii 1848-1849 gg. v Italii i osnovnye techeniya ee noveishei istoriografii," *Voprosy Istorii*, May, 1950, pp. 119-133.

²⁵Cf. *Sto Let Manifesta Kommunisticheskoi Partii K. Marksa i F. Engelsa: sbornik statei*, Moscow, 1948.

I Chose the West*

BY BORIS OLSHANSKY

ON the twenty-ninth of June, the Americans in their green jeeps entered Berlin-Wannsee. A couple of bridges on the Babelsberg-Potsdam road had been restored for their sake; our courtesy did not go farther than that. Quite the opposite. The staff of our brigade had pledged itself to vacate for them the villa of the former Italian Ambassador, Count Alfieri. Like most villas in that beautiful suburb of Berlin, it was a handsome mansion. The huge plate-glass windows opened upon a superb view of the garden descending in terraces to the smooth surface of the lake in its frame of groves. The walls of the rooms were covered with silk; there were velvet draperies, a collection of old paintings, expensive furniture, two Bechstein concert grands. . . . The day we had taken over the villa, Rudenko had warned the staff: "Be careful to keep everything in perfect order. We must show ourselves at our best to the Americans."

Good order was strictly enforced. Stebletsov held up the dispatch of a parcel by an officer because among its contents he had discovered a curtain that looked "like something from the villa." This went on until the day of departure. On the morning of that day, a message arrived from the commander: "Take everything you can with you! Don't leave a thing to the Americans!"

In the twinkling of an eye all the former "rules of conduct" were forgotten. Hurriedly the leather was cut from the armchairs, the draperies were torn down, the silk was ripped off the walls. The rugs and the two grand pianos fell to the commander, the political aide, and the quartermaster. The "heavy freight" was shipped home in trucks, with Sasha Pokrovsky assigned to accompany the transport "on an official mission."

The meeting with the Americans took place in a friendly atmosphere with mutual compliments, "Okay" here, "Okay" there, backslapping, whiskey-drinking, exchanging of "Camels" and *makhorka*. There was respect on both sides: they were impressed by our fighting record, we were awed by their famous technology. Barter-trading stimulated the process of getting acquainted. The Americans brought

*These are excerpts, translated into English, from the author's book *My prikhodim s vostoka* (We come from the East), 1954 [Ed.].

with them whole sacks of wrist and pocket watches, the passion of our men for them having received wide publicity.

The Negroes with their flashing, friendly smiles were well liked. Contact with the British was not so easily established. With them, every sergeant put on airs like a lord, strutting stiffly along the street as if he had swallowed a rod. Instances of excessive arrogance and standoffishness were frequent. In a car of the Berlin Stadtbahn (city railway) our sergeant approached a British soldier to have a friendly chat with him in broken German-Russian. All his attempts to get acquainted were in vain, the "son of Albion" kept staring ahead, imperturbable and immobile as a rock, puffing away at his pipe. At last our sergeant got hot under the collar and with typical Russian impulsiveness brought his horny fist close to the Britisher's nose shouting: "So that's the kind you are! I'll show you yet! The Americans are not like that. . . . I'll give it to you!"

Brawls about women flared up all the time. Yet, by and large, friendships with the "Yankees" and the "Tommies" were not unusual. The commanding officers viewed such relationships with misgivings and tried to discourage them by issuing stricter "rules of conduct" or transferring the disobedient men to other units. Nevertheless, it could happen in those golden days that this or that Russian could go off, as a guest, on an unauthorized trip to London or to Paris.

On the fourteenth to sixteenth of August, the SMERSH (military counter-intelligence agency), together with the military administration, organized the first raid throughout the zone in enforcement of the rules of the Occupational régime. All German apartments were searched, allegedly with the purpose of discovering hidden Nazis, but actually to ferret out Russian members of the armed forces fraternizing with the population. The political instructor, Stebletsov, declared, for all to hear, that any officer who would be caught would face demotion. I was trapped by the raid like many others. A knock at the door: "Aufmachen! Open the door! A patrol!"

It was a humiliating situation, but I could not stay where I was. I hid in the closet, which had a window, and looked out to see if it would be possible to jump down into the yard. I was on the second floor, rather high up, and the yard was paved with stones. I climbed out and clung with my hands to the narrow ledge. Later, when they left and I got back by the same way, I wondered how I managed to hold on.

. . . First Lieutenant Volodin, on duty at the commandant's office at Halle, petitioned for permission to marry a German girl. Marshal Zhukov entered his resolution with his own hand: "To be dismissed from his post; the action [?] to be investigated at the general assembly of the officers." While the "investigation" was going on, the first lieutenant retired to an adjoining room and shot himself. . . . On the stage of the "Scala" music hall, a popular German performer, "Minna the Parlormaid," sang a little song with the refrain "Komm, Frau, komm," addressing it to the officers in the first row. The officers smiled uneasily. On the way back to their unit, one of them, who apparently had been pondering the little joke, remarked gloomily: "Well, better 'Komm Frau' than put a bullet through one's head like Volodin."

"Ghetto" was the nickname given to Soviet Karlshorst by its inmates. It was surrounded by a fence and guarded by sentries. Security measures should have been limited to the protection of the general staff and, to be on the safe side, of one or two other departments. "Why place women and diapers under guard?" remarked a leading official of the SVAG (Soviet Military Administration in Germany), thus voicing a politically shortsighted idea. "After all, the 'compound' is visited daily by hundreds of Germans, and spies are known to always have their papers in order." "But you forget the main thing, the fence," General Andreev corrected the myopic officer, "it is a symbol; it constantly reminds our citizens of the capitalist encirclement. The fence is there not so much for the foreigners, the Germans, as for you and me, comrade colonel."

The history of Soviet Karlshorst was that of a ceaseless struggle of two principles, tyranny and opposition, a mostly tacit, yet tangible and stubborn opposition. The Soviet citizens failed to understand General Andreev's point of view and obstinately kept asking: "Why are we fenced off? Why are the Americans free to live and to work at large? Just look at their sentries, loafing around and chewing gum. . . ."

. . . An undesirable, critical attitude was developing. Now and again the censors had to deal with letters home from Russian women such as these:

"... I live here as in paradise, and I think of the past with horror. I am asking my husband how long this will last. If you could only see what German apartments look like; the ultimate in comfort and coziness. How I should like to arrange everything at home like this!

How I long to live like a human being. Much has been destroyed here, yet there is nothing like the critical housing shortage at home, despite the presence of so many expatriates from the East. . . ."

Or, "I am trying to get as much as possible out of my stay abroad. I have travelled with my little daughter all over the Eastern zone. We went to Switzerland, Leipzig, Dresden, the Isle of Ruegen, and to Goethe's house at Weimar. I let my little girl look and learn; she'll hardly have a chance ever to see it again. . . ."

Our fundamental beliefs were being shaken.

. . . I listened to the last sounds of the song dying away and then turned off the radio. Moscow was celebrating Red Army Day, the thirtieth anniversary of the army. Once again they extolled their victories to the skies, once again they were sabre-rattling and threatening the world. These eulogies, these victories—what did they bring to the heroes of the army but oceans of blood and a host of unfulfilled hopes? My hand groped for another station. The announcer recounted the scenario of the moving picture "The Battle of Stalingrad." "In the study of comrade Stalin . . ." "Enters comrade Stalin . . ." "The divisional commander reports to comrade Stalin . . ." So it went, the same old stuff. We had been cheated of our victory under the cheap yet convenient pretext that everything had been done not by us, but by "him," by the "incomparable and unsurpassed" Stalin. I switched to still another station and I heard another voice that sounded Russian but came from a faraway foreign country. We were allied with that country in the war, but by then our rulers mortally hated it. They hated it and that meant they feared it.

Evenings, here in Berlin, we all listened to the Voice of America and the BBC; or else we tried to get Madrid on a short wave. Our comments on what we heard depended on the degree of our mutual trust. Usually we disapproved of the general tone as well as of many particular items of our former Allies' anti-Russian programs. Too gentlemanly. We believed it should be done differently: what "they" need is a punch on the head; let them have it, the plain truth, with nothing held back. Much of the Western propaganda was too petty, computing credits and debits like bookkeepers, boasting of their famous "business." It was not a question of dollars, after all!

Rumors were abroad in Karlshorst, passed from mouth to mouth in a sneering way, that on some fine day the Allies would drop an

atomic bomb on us with a bang! The "brass," of course, would clear out well in time and would make off by air just as they did in 1941. Fantastic fabrications were circulated about leaflets allegedly dropped all over Karlsruh, reading: "Await our parachutists!" The Germans, for their part, were said to be preparing a "massacre of St. Bartholomew." A pity the victims would not be those who deserved it most.

The cold war gained in intensity and at the same time another war was going on, that of the government against its own citizens. It was being waged on three fronts: political-educational, administrative, and that of punitive police action. On the first front, the offensive was directed chiefly against the women. The newspaper *Sovietskoye Slovo* carried a series of articles on the theme: "What is the mission of Soviet women abroad?" The Political Department of the SVAG devoted special attention to the "women's problem." At a meeting of the wives of SVAG officials, General Ovchinikov fulminated:

"What are you up to? Getting Germanized, are you? Imitating the rotten West? Have you forgotten your duty to the government and the Party to which you owe a happy life? Well, we'll remind you! We are going to send you back with such 'characters' you'll shake in your shoes. . . ."

. . . Things had developed according to an inevitable pattern. Never before had I felt such a passionate hatred of the tyrant-state that controlled my life. Every attempt to explain, to justify, was futile; apology turned into condemnation. And I felt that I was right, since every day brought concrete evidence that in my repudiation of the system I did not stand alone, that, openly or secretly, millions of my comrades and countrymen, both within and without the Party, were with me; millions who in deed and not in name had saved the country and had carried the whole deadly burden of the war on their shoulders.

Many a time have I tried to analyze the reasons why this was so. Who was responsible? The answer was plain—Stalin. It was he, the embodiment of an organically vicious system, who would not or could not understand what it was we had expected of the year nineteen forty-five, both for him and for ourselves. He missed a unique and irretrievable chance to earn the forgiveness of our non-vindictive people for all the harm he had done them. It was he, the zealous and cynical executor of the fanatical experiment, who had ignominiously cheated us, who had trampled our most sacred aspirations in the

dust, who had turned our country into a vast camp of paupers and tramps, and us, its defenders, into objects of a humiliating, unprecedented control. It was he who had haggled over the Italian colonies; it was he who today was pushing us into the abyss of a new slaughter and was making us odious to the whole world. It was Stalin who time and again was driving us, his people, to irrational acts.

What was one to do? Go back home and live there hidden away in a corner, trying "to forget everything and be forgotten by all"? Impossible. I would never be able to forget anyway; I would choke with impotent resentment, or else be driven to some irreparable, yet utterly useless step. Or, stay on here, in the service of a contemptible government, as long as I can stand it? I felt that I would not be able to stand it much longer.

. . . It looked as if my fate were taking the long-expected turn. Yesterday Margarita visited the consulate to inform herself about the possibility of obtaining Soviet citizenship. "What do you need it for?" an official in a steel-blue uniform courteously asked her. "Ah! Is that so? . . . Well, we've had no instructions so far. You may get the necessary papers ready. Here you are." He handed her five voluminous questionnaires and the next day I was summoned to my chief.

"Tell me, who is your wife?"

"Just a person," I answered rather jauntily.

"What is her nationality? Are you aware that it is forbidden to have anything to do with foreign women?"

"I know of no such official prohibition. We intend to legalize our marriage as soon as this is possible. She has applied for citizenship. I assume full responsibility for her political reliability."

"You are wanted at staff headquarters."

"What for, if I may ask?"

"I don't know. You have to present yourself today at 7 P.M. at General Dratvin's offices."

. . . In room forty-seven of General Dratvin's offices I was received by a very affable major.

"Please sit down. Do you know why you have been summoned?"

"I do not."

"You are having an affair with a German woman. What can you say for yourself?"

To this the customary reaction is expected: in such cases people usually try either to deny the facts or to explain them away in a frivolous way. "Well, you know how it is . . . after all. . . ." I reacted differently. Controlling my anger, I repeated what I told my chief.

"Is that so?" the major drawled out. "Will you put it in writing for General Dratvin?"

"As you wish."

I was given a sheet of paper. My written report was soon finished.

"What am I to expect?"

"Why, nothing, nothing in particular. We've had similar cases." . . . Nothing more was heard of my case. The bureaucratic mills were grinding slowly.

At my office I was very busy; I was needed there. I did not notice anyone trailing me.

After an interval I was once again summoned to my chief.

"You are no longer allowed to work."

"Why?"

"We have nothing against you as regards performance. There is another reason."

Now once more I found myself in the familiar study of Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhailenko. He seemed surprised to see me. Then he apparently recalled something, rummaged among his papers, and asked:

"What's the trouble between you and your chief?"

"There is no trouble. I have no complaints whatever."

"That's fine. Go back to your work."

I returned to my office. Again I was told that I was not allowed to work.

Shortly before the "last act," courses for officers were being organized, and I was offered the post of an instructor. I reported to the director of the courses.

"Have you left your former place of work?"

"Yes, I have."

"We should very much like to have you. But they seem to have something on you at the cadres' department. I was going to call them up."

Mikhailenko replied over the telephone: "Refrain from engaging him; get in touch with the Political Administration." An invisible spider's web with long sticky filaments was being spun around me.

"What crimes am I charged with?"

"Crimes? Why, there is no question of any crime. But then, you see, a criminal action may be subject to the statute of limitations and consigned to oblivion, while in politics, well, the criteria are different." The director of the courses smiled gently.

... For the third time I found myself in Mikhailenko's study. Our talk was tuned in the major key.

"We are sending you back to the Soviet Union and that is that. You will have to leave at once."

"Where shall I go?"

This was a rash and thoughtless question; an answer to it could hardly be expected. Yet Mikhailenko replied:

"Don't worry, the Soviet Union is a big country. They are sure to find a place for you." And to smooth over the hint, he added:

"Apply to Colonel Ovchinikov."

I was not going to apply to Colonel Ovchinikov, nor to anyone else. My decision was taken.

I had had enough!

... "And is that all?" I asked the American lieutenant. He had closed the portfolio with the questionnaires, had checked the time, half past six, and said to me: "Enough for today, Schluss!" I got up irresolutely.

"Where am I to spend the night?"

"Wherever you please," smiled the lieutenant. "You may go back where you spent last night. Tomorrow morning at nine we continue."

I was a fugitive from "there." As a precaution they should have arrested me at once. But the lieutenant repeated:

"Okay, you may go."

From my pocket I drew the automatic which for three days had been weighing down my trousers.

"At least, take this." I surrendered it formally.

For a moment the lieutenant was taken aback; then he bent over the weapon and started unloading it.

"What did you need it for?"

I explained.

"You should have thrown it away after crossing the border. Come back tomorrow."

All this was so strange, so hearteningly unusual.

The next day the interrogation went on all day, with an interrup-

tion for lunch. I was served the same lunch as my examiners. They did not ask me for factual information; what they wished to know were things like these: "How is it over there? Do they talk much about war? Is the hate propaganda against the former Allies going strong? What do people think about the situation?" The tone of the questioning was amazingly considerate.

A young man in civilian clothes entered the room. He spoke Russian with a Western-Slavic accent.

"You said you were an engineer, a mathematician. Now can you decipher this?"

On a bit of paper he drew a sinusoidal figure.

"Of course I know what it is!" I said with a laugh.

"And what do you know about equations?" naïvely asked the official in charge of the interrogation.

I explained this too. As an "extra," I drew the graph of a secant, and wrote down a few theorems. The youthful expert apologized; he was only doing his official duty. The interrogation ended.

Then I found myself in the office of a major, the chief of the local military administration.

"The major has acquainted himself with your case," I was told by the interpreter, a Latvian. "The major has been favorably impressed. He wishes you to know that, as a participant in the last war he fully appreciates the motives that prompted you to leave the service of the Soviet government and to cross the zonal border. The fact, however, of your possession of a firearm at the time of the crossing and during the following days compels the military administration, in accordance with the rules of the Occupation, to have you brought to trial. The major hopes that the preliminary investigation will confirm your statements; in that case you may expect that the outcome of the trial will be in your favor."

I stepped to the desk and shook hands with the major. We were soldiers both.

On the way to the villa assigned to me, the interpreter informed me that I was allowed to order books in Russian, German, or any other language I knew.

My detention at the villa lasted two and a half weeks. During that period I received four visits from my wife. No one else came to see me. There were no more interrogations. Once I was called to the administration office where I was presented with the charges against me: illegal crossing of the border and possession of a weapon at the

time of the crossing. This time the interpreter, a different one, of Galician descent, warned me:

"They may send you back, you know."

These words struck terror in my heart. Fear gripped me; in the evening dusk of my room it compelled me, again and again, to try the safety-razor blade I had secretly kept, against my wrist. The fear grew with every passing hour. We, alone, the "Soviet people," can fully fathom the depth of this fear. And surely no one else would be able to understand the absurd question I put to the interpreter, as I walked with him back to the villa.

"Are you sure they don't trail us?"

"Who do you mean, 'they'?"

"Why, the Soviet agents."

Again a room with high windows, with the Stars and Stripes above a table. This was the trial. I was brought here without handcuffs, chatting amiably on the way with the policeman escorting me.

"How do you do? I am your counsel," a lean gentleman in a brown suit addressed me in Russian. "The Military Administration has assigned me to defend you. I have studied the material; everything is fine."

The judge made his entrance, a tall gray-haired colonel with typical Anglo-Saxon features. He sat down behind a small desk in front of me. Next to him sat the interpreter-stenographer, a Russian girl. To the right was the prosecutor's desk. The prosecutor frowned at the material evidence on display, my revolver. My counsel sat beside me, cheerfully rustling a heap of papers.

"Why did you choose to come to the American zone?" the judge asked me. Just like that.

"Because I was disgusted with a situation that made me no better off than a slave," I replied.

I knew that I was honest; I knew that where I was now, different, humane laws were in force. I was among human beings, among future friends. That's why I was able to talk with ease and candor. That's why, in truth, I did not need a counsel.

"And yet throughout the war you did fight in the Soviet army," said the judge.

"I fought for myself, for my people, not for Stalin."

From behind his glasses the judge fixed his pale-blue eyes on me with studied severity. I answered every question truthfully. At last the flicker of a friendly smile lighted up the colonel's face.

The trial is over. My counsel did not have much to say.

"I have little to add," he declared, "to what the defendant has said here himself. The American democracy will not deceive the hopes of the defendant."

We shook hands.

"Okay," said the prosecutor. He stopped acting his part and gave my hand a squeeze.

"Okay!" I am free.

Boris Petrovich Vysheslavitsev

1877-1954

By V. ZOTOV

THE free Russian intelligentsia has suffered a lamentable loss. Professor B. P. Vysheslavitsev, one of the last representatives of that brilliant generation of Russia's philosophers and writers who either were destroyed by the Bolshevik Revolution or escaped abroad, died in Geneva, on October 2, 1954.

Born in 1877, Vysheslavitsev graduated in 1899 from the Moscow University, in his native town. He continued to study Law and Philosophy under the guidance of the late P. N. Novgorodtsev. In 1908, he passed the examinations for his doctorate, was appointed *Privatdocent* and was granted a two-year fellowship for study abroad. He worked for some time at the Marburg University, where, at that time, philosophy was taught by such eminent scholars as Hermann Kohen and Paul Nathorp. Here, he met the German philosopher, Nikolai Hartmann, with whom he remained on friendly terms until the end of his life. In Marburg, Vysheslavitsev prepared his thesis on the ethics of Fichte, which opened a promising academical career for its author. He began his pedagogical work at the Moscow University by giving a course on the history of political doctrines, which always attracted a great number of students. At the same time, he lectured on history of philosophy at the Moscow Commercial Institute and at Shaniavsky's People's University. In 1917, he was appointed professor of the Moscow University. His academic career was cut short by the Communist Revolution and, by 1922, he was a homeless emigrant.

In Berlin, he became connected with the Y.M.C.A. and began lecturing on philosophical and religious subjects under the auspices of that organization. Since 1924, together with the late N. Berdyaev, he was editor of the Russian religious philosophical review *Put'* (The Way). During the same period, he wrote a great number of articles on philosophy, psychology, and religion, lectured at the Russian Theological Institute of Paris, was actively associated with the Ecumenical Movement and published an important philosophical work, *The Ethics of the Transfigured Eros*.

He spent the last ten years of his life in Switzerland. His last two books published in Russian, *The Philosophical Poverty of Marxism* and *The Crisis of the Industrial Civilization* are devastating criticisms of the Marxist theory. These books are widely read and studied by scores of former Soviet citizens, this side of the Iron Curtain, who have been brought up in the belief that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is the only scientific explanation of the origin of life and of where human society is "inevitably" going.

Death interrupted the life work of the eminent thinker and writer at the pinnacle of his intellectual career. Although under great suffering, he retained, to the very last, the full lucidity of his remarkable intellect. A man of vast and extensive culture, a great lover and connoisseur of art and music, a brilliant lecturer and conversationalist and, last but not least, a charming and loyal friend, Vysheslavitsev was loved and admired by all who had the privilege of knowing him. His death was mourned by the entire press of free Russia.

Book Reviews

PIPES, RICHARD. *The Formation of the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954. 355 pp. \$6.50.

The disintegration of the Russian Empire, the struggle of its various peoples for independence, and the formation of the Soviet Union as a result of Bolshevik victory, form the subject matter of this important study. Though in recent years several books have appeared dealing with the national question in Russia, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, is the first comprehensive work describing in detail the nationality problem in Russia on the eve of the Revolution, giving an account of the theories of nationalism held by the Socialists (both Bolshevik and Menshevik), tracing the events which led to the formation of several independent states on the territory of the former Empire, and describing the methods through which the Bolsheviks won their victories and formed the Soviet Union. Dr. Pipes has succeeded remarkably well in elucidating a most complex subject and in giving a systematic, well documented, and well written account of the stormy years, 1917-1923.

National antagonisms and conflicts had long existed within the Russian Empire. When the Revolution shattered central authority, the various subject peoples began actively to struggle for autonomy or even outright independence. The author tells of the national movements in Belorussia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Volga-Ural area, and Central Asia. He traces the development of Marxian theories

of nationalism from Marx, through Bauer, Luxemburg, Plekhanov, and Lenin, to Stalin, and shows how the theories were abandoned, modified, or transformed when actually put into operation.

The struggle of the Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Armenians, and other peoples of the Empire for independence was further complicated by the civil war between the Russians themselves and by the incursions of the Germans, the Turks, and the British. Out of this chaos the Bolsheviks succeeded in fashioning a unified state in which absolute centralization was concealed behind a mask of federalism.

While the events in the Ukraine and Transcaucasia have received attention before, the story of the Tatars, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Kazakhs, and Tajiks, is told for the first time in English. One of the most interesting episodes related by Dr. Pipes is that of the Tatar Communist leader, Sultan-Galiev, at one time a protégé and an assistant of Stalin. Sultan-Galiev was a proponent of what may be called the Eastern orientation. He believed that "the weakest link in the capitalist chain was not the West but the East." Disappointed in the Soviet policies toward the Moslems, he later evolved a theory according to which the basic revolutionary conflict of the twentieth century was not between classes as Marx had taught, but between the imperialist West and the colonial East. These views could not be tolerated and Sultan-Galiev, like so many other Moslem leaders, was finally purged.

The revolution and civil war in Turkestan assumed the character

of a struggle of the Russians against the native population. The Reds as well as the Whites were most of all concerned with keeping the Uzbeks, Turkomans, and Tajiks from gaining control of the government. When an autonomous Moslem government was organized in Kokand, Russian forces were dispatched by the Tashkent Soviet to put it down. Kokand was captured and a general massacre took place. "After three days of stealing and slaughter . . . the soldiers poured gasoline on the houses in the Old City and set them on fire. The Moslem quarter was almost entirely destroyed." Such treatment of the natives provoked widespread resistance and took the form of the Basmach movement, a guerilla which lasted for almost a decade.

Within the Communist Party itself the national question became an issue in 1920-1922. It was then that the seeds of "nationalist deviation" were planted and Stalin emerged as the most powerful individual in the newly born Soviet bureaucracy.

Dr. Pipes shows that in the anarchic post-revolutionary period federalism, which was essentially incompatible with the Marxian belief in governmental centralization, was actually "a step in the direction of centralization, since it gave an opportunity to bring together once more borderland areas which during the Revolution had acquired the status of independent republics." Moreover, the centralized structure of the Communist Party and its rigid internal discipline ensured its complete domination and mastery over all state organs. Thus the formal structure of the Soviet state from the very beginning did not reflect the real distribution of power but was, rather, a convenient fiction.

The "federal" Soviet state, unified through the monolithic Communist Party, turned out to be an instrument of national oppression against which even some Communists found themselves compelled to protest. The Georgian party crisis of 1922, when the entire Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia resigned in protest against the methods used by Moscow in forcing the formation of a Transcaucasian federation, revealed the inability of the Bolsheviks to agree even among themselves on the national question. Lenin, who was much concerned, failed to realize that nationalism was more than a mere survival of the "accursed past" and that his own authoritarian system of government was responsible for the failure of the Soviet nationality policy. His attempts to remedy some of the more glaring iniquities did not go to the heart of the problem and remained fruitless. On January 31, 1924, the Second Congress of Soviets ratified the first constitution of the U.S.S.R., formally completing the process of the formation of the Soviet Union.

The author has examined most of the sources available in the West and built his narrative on a solid documentary foundation. Though Dr. Pipes did not renounce his right of making moral judgements, he has preserved throughout the highest standard of scholarly objectivity.

However, in a book of this scope a few mistakes or inaccuracies are almost inevitable. Thus in the famous Shamkhor massacre several hundred and not several thousand Russian soldiers lost their lives. The author states that after the overthrow of the Baku Soviet in the summer of 1918, "Shaumian and the other Baku Commissars departed at

night on a boat for Astrakhan. They were intercepted on the way by war vessels of the Social Revolutionary government of Transcaspia, brought ashore, and later executed." Actually the ship, *Turkmen*, on which the Commissars sailed from Baku was not intercepted. The crew refused to take it to Astrakhan and offered the Commissars a choice of Petrovsk, held by the White General Bicherakhov, Anzali on the Persian coast, held by the British, or Krasnovodsk, in the hands of a pseudo-government in which the Social Revolutionaries predominated. The Commissars, believing that Krasnovodsk was the safest, decided to sail there. However, minor slips such as these can in no way detract from the value of this dispassionate, scholarly study which will remain for a long time the standard text on the formation of the U.S.S.R.

F. KAZEMZADEH

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E. H. CARR, *A History of Soviet Russia. The Interregnum, 1923-1924*. New York, Macmillan, 1954. 392 pp. \$5.00.

With *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*

E. H. Carr has brought his *History of Soviet Russia*, begun with the three volumes entitled "The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923," up to the death of Lenin. To readers of the earlier volumes the present installment will offer few surprises either as to quality or as to method. Mr. Carr had earlier fully worked out his techniques for approaching Soviet history, and, if anything, in *The Interregnum* he has applied them with even greater skill than previously. We are in a familiar world of seemingly effortless and lucid mas-

tery of a complicated historical narrative. The author picks his way through the maze of his material with the sure-footed ease of one who knows the terrain by heart.

The present volume covers the period from the beginning of 1923 to May, 1924, and is divided into three parts dealing, respectively, with economic, diplomatic and political affairs. The subject, then, of the first section is the "scissors" crisis. Mr. Carr's exposition of the causes and the vicissitudes of the crisis are as lucid and sound as his earlier pages on Soviet economic affairs, which is to say that they are as good as anything written on the subject. The second section, dealing with the revolutionary crises in Germany and Bulgaria and with the Curzon Ultimatum, is perhaps less successful than the economic chapters. The fault, however, lies rather with the nature of the material itself than with any failure of the author. The diplomatic history of the period lacks the organic unity presented by the "scissors" crisis. The events described have little in common beyond the fact that they occurred within the same year, with the result that the chapters devoted to them read somewhat disconnectedly. Moreover, they add up to little more than the conclusion that the Soviets' international position had not basically changed under their impact. Mr. Carr's material simply did not permit the same acute generalizations about Soviet external relations possible in an earlier volume on the events from Brest-Litovsk to 1922. Nonetheless the quality of the treatment of each event, in itself, is fully up to his usual standards.

But it is the third part, dealing with internal political events, that

contains the major departure in Mr. Carr's method. In "The Bolshevik Revolution," it was the first volume, on politics, which was the least adequate. In it the Bolsheviks were by implication equated with the revolution as a whole, and all other elements in the situation were ignored as irrelevant, presumably on the grounds that because they came to naught they were not historically significant. Yet it is highly doubtful that historical significance is a function of success alone, and Mr. Carr has been justly accused of forgetting this and of succumbing to a "Marx-Whigism" which, although expressing itself through omission more than commission, was nonetheless corrosive.

In the present volume he has happily avoided the same danger. The subject is the political "interregnum" between Lenin's first illness and the thirteenth Party Congress just after his death. The treatment of the mounting struggle for power between the "triumvirate" of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin on the one hand and Trotsky and the "opposition of the forty-six" on the other is as replete as the subject allows with the tensions of conflict and the drama of decision. Stalin is not worshipped because effective, nor Zinoviev despised because bombastic and blind, nor Trotsky dismissed because he lost. The personal weaknesses and strengths, the programmatic strong points and shortcomings, of both winners and losers, are analyzed with insight and completeness, or nearly so. The only significant omission is an adequate discussion of the growth and operation of the *apparat* of the party secretariat under Stalin's direction, and of his success during this period in packing the Central Committee.

But the essential is there, a political struggle presented in all its components and ramifications, and with no sides taken. If anything, the loser, Trotsky, comes off better than the future winner, Stalin, or the latter's accomplice of the moment, Zinoviev. In spite of Mr. Carr's austere prose, a modest aura of grandeur attaches to Trotsky in his mistakes and his defeat, which does not cling to Stalin in his astuteness and his victory, or still less to Zinoviev in his vanity and his hollow triumph.

Perhaps this change of optic is to be explained by the fact that this time Mr. Carr is describing exclusively "hard-headed" Bolsheviks, with no sentimental idealists in the running; or more simply, that Stalin, by the very nature of his political personality lends himself less easily to an uncritical hero-worship than does the more engaging Lenin. But wherever the explanation may lie, it is significant that it is in writing about the internal affairs of the Party and not about the revolution as a whole that Mr. Carr has come to the awareness that Soviet history is a dramatic tension and not a triumphal march. For in spite of the general title, *A History of Soviet Russia*, his work is neither that nor a history of the Russian Revolution. It is a political, economic and diplomatic history of the Bolshevik Party and of the Soviet central government. As such it is excellent—the very best that exists—and the first solidly documented and truly intelligent general work in this precise area. If Mr. Carr had presented it as such, and had not, by an unfortunate choice of title and sub-titles, strongly implied it was more, he would have avoided what are valid criticisms, and would instead have received the unstinted praise which

is his due for what, in fact, he has accomplished. The present volume is the best proof of this contention. It is the most completely satisfactory of the series so far, and a truly impressive piece of work by any comparison, precisely because its plan implies no pretensions that the execution does not sustain.

MARTIN E. MALIA

Harvard University

KULSKI, W. W. *The Soviet Regime. Communism in Practice*. Ithaca, Syracuse University Press, 1954. 807 pp. \$8.00.

The voluminous work by Professor W. W. Kulski is a very valuable addition to the literature about the political and economic system of the Soviet Union. The author's name is well known to the readers of the *American Journal of International Law* to which he contributes, periodically, reviews of Soviet publications concerning international relations and law. In the work under review, Professor Kulski succeeds in uncovering the most significant features of the Soviet régime and in organizing the enormously extensive and diverse material.

The book consists of an introduction and five parts. Each part might easily be transformed into a separate book. The first is devoted primarily to cultural problems and ideological differences from the West. Part II characterizes the rôle of the Party, the legal status of the individual, and the political and judiciary systems. Parts III and IV consider the conditions of workers and peasants. Part V deals with the post-Stalin era. The first two parts, although very informative, are nevertheless of less importance than the others because

there are already several books in English devoted to the ideology, legal system, and government and politics of Soviet Russia. But as regards the other parts, they excel previously published works concerning the system of the exploitation of labor and the existing social stratification in the Soviet Union.

The author has collected exceedingly rich material and his documentation is impressive. He not only gives information about "Communist practice" with more details and better documentation than has been available previously, but he analyzes, compares, and interprets the collected material with the aid of the philosophy and principles in which he believes. The present writer believes that differences of ideology and of practice between the Soviet system and genuine democracy are so glaring that those scholars who limit themselves to a compilation of data and ideas from Soviet magazines and newspapers do not fulfill a very useful function. They do not explain to their readers how vicious the Soviet system is and, perhaps without intention, suggest toleration if not reconciliation with it. It is still worse when some scholars spend their time and energy trying to find some grains of "truth" and "justice" in a system whose foundations negate the great values of our civilization. Professor Kulski does not belong to this category of scholars. Quite properly, and with an abundance of references and shrewd observations, he brings to the attention of his readers the most significant and specific aspects of the Soviet régime.

Characterizing the Soviet economic system, he compares the Soviet leaders with the Pharaohs of

Egypt: "They are fascinated by the size of the pyramid, altogether forgetting the fate of those they force to build it." In connection with various shortages in the Soviet Union, he recalls the old joke that "it is easier to buy a tractor than a needle in Moscow." Referring to the usual Soviet claim that there is no contradiction between individual interests of Soviet citizens and those of the State, he writes: "'Capitalist encirclement' explains only the existence of the Soviet armed forces. But why are there special troops of the Ministry of the Interior, why are there procurators and courts, why do correctional camps exist, why are there severe criminal codes if the Soviet individual has no interest in disobeying the government and if there are no possible conflicts between him and the State?" (p. 227). Further, discussing the problem of freedom in the Soviet Union, he characterizes the conditions there as follows: "Freedom of the individual is the only merchandise which no totalitarian régime can produce without denying its very nature." (p. 717).

There are several points with which this reviewer would like to take issue. It is debatable whether Russia has inherited "Byzantine" distrust of Rome and the West and whether Russian despotism is a heritage of the Byzantine tradition. The Kievan period was the time of the most conspicuous cultural influence of Byzantium in the country of the Eastern Slavs, and yet Kievan Rus did not distrust the West at that time, nor was it despotic. There is little good reason to compare Soviet revolutionary messianism with the doctrine of "the Third Rome" of the fifteenth-century monk Philotheus.

The reader of Professor Kulski's book may get the impression that the author does not sufficiently distinguish Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism. The corresponding part (pp. 73-125) is not sufficiently clear. Yet, Professor Kulski himself correctly observed that "the national interests of Russia are too easily confused in the Soviet minds with the interests of the Communist cause." (p. 540). They are easily confused in Western minds as well. Soviet expansion and Russification in the interest of world revolution have nothing in common with the interests of the Russian nation and coincide but incidentally.

There are also a few slight errors. Contrary to the author's assertion (pp. 137-138), there is, in the Soviet Union, the possibility of the existence of several candidates during the first stage of the electoral campaign. Sometimes several candidates are nominated and take part in the campaign. At the decisive moment, however, the invisible finger points to the candidate whose name is to remain on the ballots, and then all the organizations which nominate candidates agree to that one. The author neglects to note also (p. 226) that, according to the Constitutional amendment of August 10, 1953, the "working intelligentsia" is mentioned in Art. 126, besides workers and peasants.

The book under review undoubtedly deserves a more detailed study. It belongs to a comparatively small number of those works about the Soviet Union which will not lose their significance for a long time to come.

G. C. GUINS

Berkeley, California

CAROE, OLAF. *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. London, Macmillan, 1953. 300 pp. \$5.00.

Since our country was born when the ship of the desert was giving way to the white-sailed ship of the Atlantic, America knows not Samarkand and Kokand and Khorezm, nor Khiva and Bukhara, and would be hard put to locate Russian Turkestan or Chinese Turkestan on the map. It is this vast area, or the Soviet controlled part of it, which runs from the Caspian to the borders of China and lies north of Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, that is the "Soviet Empire" of Sir Olaf's book. It is a Turkish land, though scholars generally write "Turkic" to distinguish it from the inhabitants of Turkey proper. It has the same basic tongue, the same Moslem faith, the same cultural antecedents only fossilized and isolated from modern history except for first Tsarist then Soviet penetration. Sir Olaf has sought to deal with its 1200 years of history, its 18,000,000 people, its expanse of land greater than that of India and Pakistan together, and its critical importance in the history of our time. His book has the sweep and the color, the romance and the poetry, and the sympathy for peoples and a culture and a faith utterly alien to him, which such a region and such a story deserve but so rarely get. In its pages men die like heroes, their names are eternalized in story and song, but footnotes and transliteration systems and scholarly caveats are not neglected, nor are his own fighting faith and hopes concealed.

In slightly under 100 pages Sir Olaf gives the geographical setting,

the demography, and the history of this region from the eighth century through the period of the Tsarist conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Part II traces the tangled story of the impact of the 1917 revolutions, the exploits of Enver Pasha and Togan and the frightful disillusion that came to the Young Khivan and Young Bukhara movements when they tried "peaceful coexistence" and experienced the meaning of the first "people's democracies." Part III analyzes the Soviet approach to conquest and assimilation: the transformation of nationalism into "bourgeois nationalism"; Russification; collectivization and the suppression of nomadism; industrialization; and the attempts to root out the very memories by which a people lives, with Soviet rewriting of Central Asian history and the epics of its oral tradition. A closing section deals with the impact of World War II, the resumption of the Soviet or Russian advance as the British withdrew from the guardianship of the "Northwest Frontier" of Afghanistan and the Punjab, and Sir Olaf's own evaluation of the possibilities and dangers of the immediate future. He sees this Soviet Moslem world as a bridgehead through which the Kremlin may penetrate into the rest of the Moslem world, or, alternatively, as the least assimilated and possibly indigestible part of the Soviet Empire, which may go through "a resurrection such as is only to be won at the cost of a descent into hell."

"In order to bring about the disappearance of the nations of Central Asia by complete assimilation," Sir Olaf concludes, "Russia will have to torture and oppress these millions for centuries. For even if the Rus-

sian domination were assured, the people of Turkestan will not forget their freedom so far as to renounce their languages and their faiths . . . [In the end] the tide will turn and bring with it either liberation—or disappearance from the pages of history. . . .”

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

The Russian Institute
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SALISBURY, HARRISON E. *American in Russia*. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955. 328 pp. \$4.00.

Mr. Salisbury served a five-year assignment in the Soviet Union as correspondent for *The New York Times*, from 1949 until 1954. In many ways this was a bleak and cheerless experience. For, especially until Stalin's death in March, 1953, foreigners from non-Communist countries were treated as enemies. They were isolated from any normal contact with Russians, barred from factories and collective farms, spied on openly and ostentatiously. Journalists were tremendously handicapped in their work by a censorship so strict that it often refused to pass material which appeared in the controlled Soviet newspapers or which was a product of the journalist's personal observation.

However, for the dedicated newspaperman, and Mr. Salisbury makes the impression of taking his job very seriously, there were compensations. Once in a long time a tremendous story would break: the death of Stalin, for instance. And toward the end of his stay the author obtained permission to take a long trip to some of the more out-of-the-way corners of the vast Soviet Union, to Yakutia, in the frozen

North, to some of the Moslem cities in the picturesque deserts and steppes of Central Asia, to Khabarovsk, in Eastern Siberia, which Mr. Salisbury calls “General Headquarters of Slave Labor, Unlimited.”

In the past, trips of this kind have been largely reserved for selected visitors, like Mr. Henry Wallace and Mr. Owen Lattimore, who could be depended on not to recognize the difference between a concentration camp and a rest home. Mr. Salisbury brought to his travels the trained eye of the newspaperman. He was not allowed to see the inside of any concentration camp; but he gives vivid descriptions of the despairing drunkenness of Yakutsk, of the air view of Karaganda, another well-known slave labor centre, “laid out in perfect rectangular squares—as regular as cell blocks.”

In Stalinabad, near the frontier of Afghanistan, he found uprooted Volga Germans, with their pride in their working ability still unbroken. And he picked up the dim trail of a mysterious American dentist in the remote valley of Ferghana.

Next to the account of the trip, the description of the death of Stalin and of what preceded and followed it is perhaps the most interesting section of the book. Mr. Salisbury communicates effectively the sense of chilly foreboding, of fear that a new gigantic purge was in the making, which prevailed in Moscow when a number of prominent physicians, most of them Jews were reported as involved in a fantastic plot to poison prominent generals of the Red Army. Organized anti-Semitism was at its height on the eve of Stalin's death and found expression in such developments outside of Russia as the breach of relations with Israel and

the use of anti-Semitic insinuations in the trial which led to the execution of a number of prominent Czechoslovak Communists, most of them Jews.

Mr. Salisbury considers it "by no means impossible" that Stalin was murdered by a group of his close associates and remarks: "As I thought to myself that morning in the Central Telegraph Office, if Stalin was dying a natural death it was the luckiest thing that had ever happened to the men who stood closest to him. To all of them. And, I suspected, to all of Russia as well."

This seems a little inconsistent with the author's subsequent observation that "when Stalin died it seemed to many Russians a little as though God had died." The speed with which Stalin's name was dropped from Soviet publications in the first weeks of the new régime indicates that the deceased dictator was not regarded as a propaganda asset by his heirs.

Mr. Salisbury disposes of Beria with the comment that he was "too big for the triumvirate but not big enough to be dictator." He considers Marshal Georgi Zhukov and the Soviet army leaders as a force for conservatism and moderation in foreign affairs. The difficulty of assessing the realities of Soviet internal politics under conditions of isolation from normal news contacts is reflected in the fact that Mr. Salisbury identifies Malenkov as the top man in the Soviet hierarchy, superior to Khrushchev or anyone else. His book appeared just about the time when Malenkov was deposed.

Mr. Salisbury believes that the big Soviet nuclear plants are being built in remote Siberia, with power supplied by the Angara and Ob rivers. He was never permitted to

make a close study of Soviet industry or agriculture. But he records instances of the folly and futility of state planning of the economy. At one time there was a sudden increase in the output of electric irons. But this was accompanied by an acute shortage of the ironing boards which planners, with no incentive of personal profit, failed to provide.

Every foreign journalist who works for some years in the Soviet Union under a limiting and distorting censorship owes his readers and his reputation an uncensored book. Mr. Salisbury has discharged this obligation very effectively.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
Cambridge, Massachusetts

KLIMOV, GREGORY. *The Terror Machine*. Tr. from the German by H. C. Stevens. New York, Frederick Praeger, 1953. 400 pp. \$4.00.

According to his own introductory statement the author of this book is "quite an ordinary Russian, soldier and citizen. . . . His thoughts and experiences are those of the young generation of Soviet people." If that is true it should be a source of encouragement to the Western democracies, because one of the chief themes of *The Terror Machine* is the author's growing disillusionment with the Soviet régime, resulting at last in his escape to freedom.

Gregory Klimov was educated to be an engineer and began practical training in September, 1939, at the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, "the largest producer of agricultural machinery not only in the Soviet Union but in all Europe." He found the plant engaged actually in manufacturing munitions chests for

anti-tank guns. "They had been made overnight, after the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship" (with Hitler).

After the German attack in 1941 the author saw combat as an officer and was then transferred to the German Department of the Military-Diplomatic Academy in Moscow for further training. He saw, and vividly describes, Moscow's ecstatic reaction to the news of Germany's surrender, participated in the victory parade of May 24, 1945, and was subsequently assigned to the staff of the Soviet Military Administration at Karlshorst where he served until his defection to the West in 1947. During this period of service at Karlshorst his attitude toward the Soviet régime became increasingly hostile, while his superiors continually urged him to join the Communist Party. When he was abruptly ordered to return to the Soviet Union a fateful choice confronted him: either to obey and join the Party as a prerequisite to further advancement, or to flee. He made the irrevocable decision and took the hard road to freedom.

His experiences and observations, as well as those of many others with whom he came in contact, are presented impressionistically. There is little chronological narrative and there is no systematic analysis of the composition and work of the Soviet Military Administration. Each chapter contains episodes, not necessarily coherent, described in a rambling but always vigorous style. He sketches the careers of some of his friends, showing how the grip of the Soviet state crushed or deformed the lives of most of them in one way or another. There is even an account of an inconclusive romance between

the author and the daughter of a Soviet general.

The book abounds in lively vignettes and viewpoints which make its reading eminently worthwhile. They are so fresh as to leave no doubt concerning their authenticity. Consider this observation: "After the Russian soldiers had lived a while in Germany . . . they called the German communists rogues and venal riffraff. Any Soviet citizen who has seen Europe is quite convinced that only degenerates in the pay of Moscow can be communists." What comment on the Russian standard of living during the war could be more effective than the simple statement that the people bought American coffee by the sack when it was available, not to brew it, but to make bread from the beans!

There is a brief, moving introduction by the late Ernst Reuter.

JOHN CLINTON ADAMS

Dartmouth College

VOINOV, NICHOLAS. *The Waif: the Autobiography of a Russian Youth*. New York, Pantheon Books, 1955. 292 pp. \$3.95; LERMOLO, ELIZABETH. *Face of a Victim*. New York, Harper and Bros., 1955. 311 pp. \$3.75.

These two books have a good deal in common: both are remarkable personal stories and both provide authentic close-ups of Stalin's Russia.

The Waif is an autobiography of a "bezprizornik," an orphaned and abandoned child of which there were millions in Soviet Russia. These were children whose parents fell victims to the Revolution and Civil War in the twenties and to collectivization and Stalin's purges in the

thirties. These waifs banded together and were forced by circumstances to steal and murder in order to survive. Hunger, the NKVD, and World War Two took a great toll of them. Yet, today, judging from the official press, juvenile delinquency is still a serious problem in Soviet Russia.

The author of this autobiography was born in an industrial town in the North Caucasus, the son of an engineer. His father vanished in one of the purges in the early thirties and the child, aged six, was thrust into the squalor and neglect of a children's home, run by brutal officials. Intermittently, he ran away from this home and joined up with a group of juvenile delinquents, orphans like himself, who fought desperately for bare existence. In the winter they would dig themselves into manure heaps to keep from freezing; in summer they escaped into the mountains, descending only to steal and to organize hold-ups. The attitude toward the régime which deprived them of parents and home was one of cold hatred and contempt.

In spite of their depravity, the waifs had an ethical code of their own: they believed in freedom and were fiercely loyal to each other; some were capable of self-sacrifice and showed compassion and concern for the younger and weaker of their companions.

The author himself somehow maintained an inward balance and emerged morally unscathed. For a short time he attended school and was even persuaded to join the Komsomol, but he soon left, disgusted with the hypocrisy and the brutality of the officials and teachers. After Hitler's invasion of Russia, we see him joining the Red

Army. He was taken prisoner by the Germans, escaped, was caught again and then deported to France. There he was liberated, only to face a new, desperate danger—repatriation. In an interesting and dramatic chapter, he describes how, with the aid of White Russian émigrés in Paris, he eluded the Soviet agents and finally managed to escape into the free world. At last, as he puts it, he became "established in a society where every human being has the right to belong [and] to contribute his share to the realization of the ideas that make life worth living. . . ."

Elizabeth Lermolo, the wife of a former Tzarist officer, was 32 when, during the night of December 1, 1934, the NKVD arrested her in connection with Sergei Kirov's assassination. *Face of a Victim* is a moving and vivid account of the eight years she was made to spend in various prisons in the Urals and Siberia. The author had no connection with Kirov's murder. As it happened, however, she had several conversations, in the town where she was exiled, with Leonid Nikolaev, the Communist who fired the shot that killed Kirov, thus setting off a blood bath that wiped out a whole generation of the Old Bolsheviks. In a striking chapter, the author describes how Stalin personally interrogated her. He was apparently anxious to establish her as a link between the murderer and the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, on whom he was determined to pin the murder. The remarkable thing about Elizabeth Lermolo is that she never signed a false confession, in spite of torture and the endless interrogations to which she had to submit. One gets the impression of her as a woman of unusual spiritual

reserves and will power, yet at the same time tender and feminine.

The book abounds in interesting revelations about the Kremlin leaders, which the author gathered from various political prisoners she met in the course of her eight years spent in Stalin's prisons. Among these was Nikolaev's estranged wife, who was first at the scene of the murder; a former aide of Stalin, who told her how Stalin arranged to have Kirov murdered; a companion of Nadezhda Allilueva, Stalin's second wife, murdered by the dictator; a fanatic Communist woman, for twenty years an official of the secret police, now herself a prisoner sharing a cell with the author, who could not stop talking of the tortures and executions she had taken part in. These and others are well drawn and, as Alexandra Tolstoi remarked in her Foreword, "are interesting, pitiful, and completely believable."

The Waif and Face of a Victim should be of interest to a wide reading public. They are particularly recommended to those who are still in doubt as to the real nature of Stalin's régime. It is more than likely, however, that those who still want to see something good and "progressive" in the Soviet régime will spurn these books, preferring to cherish their illusions, or whatever, by now, is left of them.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

SMITH, C. A. (Ed.). *Escape from Paradise*. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1954. 243 pp. \$3.50.

To the long list of personal accounts of persecution, suffering and slow death in Soviet prisons and labor camps started in this country

by Professor Cherniavin with his sober and moving story, *I Speak for the Silent* (which is still the best), is now added this collection of narratives by "seven who escaped and one who did not." There is not one Russian among them; they comprise one Rumanian, one Spaniard, one Estonian, two Poles, one Czech, one Latvian, and one Bulgarian. While their stories differ one from another, underlying them all is the record of suffering under a régime which recognizes no law, human or divine, but the directives of a tyrannic, totalitarian government which is suspicious of any individuality and aims at curbing every will to the Communist doctrine and Party line. And since the experiences related in this book took place between 1939 and 1950, they prove that the harsh, inhuman methods adopted in the late twenties were continued through the war and the post-war period.

Of the eight stories, the most moving and convincing are those of the Rumanian, Gire Adriana Georgescu, and of the Bulgarian, Michael Shipkov (the one who did not escape). These also reveal how spineless and inadequate were the British and American missions in these countries which were unable (or unwilling) to stand by their friends in the face of the local Communist tyrants set up and protected by the Soviet government. Much less convincing are the story of the Pole, who successfully posed as a Russian Communist for a long time until sent to Red Poland, from whence he escaped, and that of the Carpatho-Ruthenian who was permitted to return after three years of imprisonment, since he was obviously and thoroughly indoctrinated. But what mars an otherwise

worthy book is the inclusion of the story by the notorious Communist leader of the Spanish Civil War, "El Campesino," who relates cynically how his numerous affairs with influential Soviet females helped him to escape. To include his tale among those of decent people does not help the purpose of this book—to lay bare the inhumanity of Communism.

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

University of Toronto

DUNLOP, D. M. *The History of the Jewish Khazars*. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1954. 293 pp. \$5.00.

The history of the Khazars presents an interesting subject from a variety of angles. Jewish historiography has been enriched by a fascinating chapter on the conversion to Judaism of the Khazars, their dynasty, upper class, and part of the common people. To ancient and medieval Russian history the Khazars have added some colorful episodes. World history would have taken another turn, perhaps, had not the Khazars contained the push of Islam to Southern Russia in the first half of the eighth century. The Arab thrust from Spain deep into France was stopped by the decisive victory of Charles Martel between Tours and Poitiers in 732.

George Vernadsky has dealt with the origins of the Khazar State and its history until 737 in volume I of his *Ancient Russia* (1943, pp. 201-260); in volume II he analyzed the Khazar-Russian relations. The present work of D. M. Dunlop, lecturer in Islamic history at Cambridge (England), is a thorough study of the Greek, Arabic, Hebrew,

Syriac, Armenian, Georgian, Persian, Turkish, Russian, Latin, and Chinese sources referring to the Khazars. The latter ones were unknown until recently. The vast literature used by the author includes recent contributions of Polish and Israeli scholars.

Russian scholarship has given much attention to research in the history of the Khazars. We mention only Fraehn, Dorn, A. A. Kunik, Westberg, A. J. Harkavy, D. A. Khvolson, P. K. Kokovtzev, W. Barthold, M. I. Artamonov and Y. D. Brutzkus. Kokovtzev's *Yevreysko-Khazar'skaya perepiska v X veke* (Leningrad, 1932) containing six Hebrew documents with Russian translations, ample notes and a lucid introduction, is of extraordinary value. Artamonov's *Ocherki drevneshey istorii Khazar* (Leningrad, 1936) deals with events up to 738.

The Khazars, a nomad tribe hailing from Central Asia, were related to the Huns or, as others have suggested, to the West Turks. Their arrival in the Caucasus by the end of the sixth century, where they settled for good, seems to be a pretty well established historical fact. From the Caucasus they pushed northwest and westward to the banks of the Volga and the Don reaching the shore of the Asov Sea. In the ninth century, the Khazar Empire witnessed its widest expansion, from the Oxus (ancient name of the Amu Daria) in Asia—if one assumes that the Ghuzz nomads east of the Caspian Sea acknowledged the Khazar supremacy—to Kiev and the middle Dnieper in the West.

However, powerful neighbors—the Baghdad Khalifate, the Byzantine Empire, various tribes, and the Kievan Russians frequently attacked the Khazars. The Khazar

wars are dealt with at length. In the middle of the seventh century the Khazars withdrew to Itil on the Volga where they battled with the Bulgars. By the end of the seventh century, the Khazars started an offensive against the Khalifate. In the seven hundred twenties they invaded Armenia and Adharbayjan (the modern Azerbaidzhan). Their army of 300,000 men, according to the Arab chronicler, Balami, won a great victory at Ardabil which caused a stir in the Baghdad Khalifate. Khazar units reached the vicinity of Mossul. But as a result of Arab counter attacks, the Khazars were decisively beaten in 737. The Kagan, as their ruler was called, adopted Islam. However, the Arabs did not fully exploit their victory; they retired. Khazaria left to itself recovered from the terrible blow. In 740, the Kagan was converted to Judaism.

This central event in the history of the Khazars is minutely analyzed by the author in the light of Arabic sources (pp. 89-115) and Hebrew sources (pp. 116-170). In his opinion, leading Khazars had come under the influence of Judaism before 730, during the Khazar offensive against the Khalifate. In 740, after a religious disputation before the Kagan Bulan, Judaism was adopted by him and his court. One of his successors, Obadjah, revived religious life about 800, and introduced Rabbinical Judaism.

Relations with Kievan Russia are treated more briefly. The Duke Sviatoslav defeated the Khazars utterly in 965 but they were not destroyed. People returned to their homes. The Khazars disappeared finally in the thirteenth century during the Mongolian invasions of Russia.

Attention is to be drawn to the omission of T. K. Modelsky's study *Król Gebalim* (The King of the Gebalim in the letter of Hasday to the Khazar Kagan Josef, Lwów, 1910). Incidentally, Kokovtzev has also failed to refer to this work in his note on the Gebalim in his above quoted work.

MARK WISCHNITZER

New York City

BREWSTER, DOROTHY. *East-West Passage: A Study in Literary Relationships*. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1954. 328 pp. 21s.

Miss Brewster has collected and assembled information on a great variety of related topics: the growth of our knowledge of Russia through the centuries beginning with the first Elizabethan travelers' accounts; the changing attitude toward Russia and Russian events (such as the Crimean war) of figures (such as Catherine the Great); the importation of Russian literature to England and the United States in the nineteenth century and the rôle of many intermediaries, translators, biographers, literary historians, and critics; Russia as a theme of English poetry and novels; the reception and influence of the Russian theater in the Anglo-Saxon world; the actual influence of the great Russian novelists on English and American fiction; and, finally, the reaction to Soviet and Marxist ideology in the literature between the two wars. Much of the information assembled is curious, and often depressing or amusing, as Miss Brewster has an eye for the absurd or pathetic and quotes freely from widely scattered periodicals and books. But, as she herself states in her Preface, most of the information is culled from sec-

ondary sources: she has drawn extensively, e.g. on Royal Gettmann's *Turgenev in England and America*, on Miss Muchnic's *Dostoevsky's English Reputation*, and on many miscellaneous sources among which the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* looms very large.

As a digest of information the book should be welcome, but unfortunately its usefulness is seriously impaired by its many deficiencies.

Miss Brewster, though obviously cramped for space, has written a chatty, digressive, poorly organized book. She can quote at length vague twaddle by V. S. Pritchett (p. 224) or by Ashley Dukes on the "window of stained glass" of a Chekhov play (p. 237); she can give us long quotations from a review *Fact* referring, e.g., to a study of English hotel conditions (pp. 279-280), all of which has nothing to do with Russia; or she can again quite arbitrarily single out a book by Georg Brandes, a Dane, for full description (pp. 118-21) while ignoring almost all other non-English information; or she can indulge in such irrelevancies as telling us that the *Festschrift* for G. R. Noyes (whose book on Tolstoy is not even mentioned) was published by the Cornell University Press. "And this is a good place to recall," Miss Brewster continues in her characteristic manner, "that Eugene Schuyler, the translator in 1867 of Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*, left to Cornell his collection of Slavic folklore, literature, and history." (p. 149).

With all this space wasted, Miss Brewster can do little more than state the central problems of Russian influence on English and American literature: no novel is closely examined, no criticism, not even

that of Henry James on Turgenev, is properly analyzed. For the most part, Miss Brewster's own critical point of view remains unclear but when she endorses literary opinions she often goes sadly astray. She can approve of the commonplace, reductive view of Dostoevsky in Carr's biography (p. 162); or can praise D. H. Lawrence's reflections on the "Grand Inquisitor" as "penetrating" (p. 181) though they misinterpret the legend completely; or she can agree with James Huneker that "Zola might have gone to school to learn the alphabet of his art" from Gorky (p. 158).

The last chapters on the Soviet influence between the wars are particularly inadequate both as analysis and description. They culminate in an extensive reproduction of the amazingly naïve views of Rex Warner on the relation of the state and the artist. The state *must* support the artist even when he undermines its foundation. This is followed by a "Conclusion" envisaging a "Humanism of the future" in which the Kremlin would appear not as "Byzantium barbarized" (a phrase of Henry Adams) but as Lewis Carroll saw it (on his trip in 1867) with "glittering points of light on the gilded domes" (p. 310). It seems appropriate that the last quotation in the book should come from the author of *Alice in Wonderland*.

RENÉ WELLEK

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MICROFILMS OF "PRAVDA" AND "IZVESTIA," A PROJECT COMPLETED.

Microfilm files have been compiled of the two Russian newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, from March 18, 1917, and February 28, 1917, re-

spectively, through June, 1938. This work began late in 1948 under the auspices of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, with the preparatory correspondence and the complicated basic lists made by Mrs. Irene Hay, Bibliographical Consultant to the Center. In March, 1950 the work was transferred to the Newspaper Microfilm Project of the Harvard College Library, which has been filming these papers currently from July 1, 1938, to date. The work has been completed in the Library by James W. Pirie, Laurence J. Kipp, and, since September, 1950, under the direction of David C. Weber.

For *Pravda*, the Library of Congress set was used to make the base negative film. Mrs. Hay made arrangements for this film, and it was in Cambridge by the time the Library became responsible for completing the file. In order to complete the run, negative film was purchased of copies in the Harvard College Library, Columbia University Library, the New York Public Library, the Hoover Library at Stanford, the British Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale, and the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Paris. This composition brought the film to within thirty-nine issues of being complete: 24 issues in 1917, 9 in 1918, 1 in 1919, 4 in 1920, and 1 in 1921. For the period after March 16, 1918, the Moscow edition was chosen.

The difficulty with torn or otherwise defective issues, variety in photographic density, the two systems of dating used until January 16, 1918, the several numbering systems used for the six titles under which it appeared the first year, and

the location of acceptable copies for filming, made the work last until July of 1952. After all the effort that was put into the project, it certainly is to be regretted that the occasional defections must remain, for it is extremely unlikely that a project of such magnitude can again be undertaken at some later time when there is knowledge of better copies than have been found for this film. Indeed, the disintegration of the newsprint has almost insured that this will be the final edition. On the other hand, scholars may be grateful to the Russian Research Center for initiating the preservation that has now been accomplished. This microfilm edition places the first twenty-one years of *Pravda* on 5,160 feet of film.

For *Izvestia*, the Harvard Law School Library file was used to make the base negative; and other issues were obtained from the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, the Hoover Library at Stanford, the University of California Library at Berkeley, Columbia University Library, the British Museum, and several in France were located and filmed by the Service International de Microfilms in Paris. This compilation involved 401 splices though it was a much more simple task than was the *Pravda* compilation. Here again damaged issues caused a great delay in the work and the issues of the first two years are frequently poorer in legibility than was desirable. Only the issue for August 7, 1924 is lacking from the final film edition, which was completed in January of this year. This microfilm edition places the first twenty-one years of *Izvestia* on 4,743 feet of film.

Positive copies of these microfilms, as well as the issues currently filmed since 1938, are available to scholars and libraries at cost. Those interested in any part of the film

should write the Newspaper Microfilm Project of the Harvard College Library.

DAVID C. WEBER

Harvard University

BOOK NOTICES

Anthology of Old Russian Literature.

Edited by Ad. Stender-Petersen, in collaboration with Stefan Congrat-Butlar. New York, Columbia University Press, 1954. 542 pp. \$8.50.

"The purpose of this *Anthology* is to give to those American and Western European students who are acquainted with the Russian language a direct and personal impression of medieval Russian literature through selected readings." The basic criteria of selection from the old Russian texts of the Kiev and Moscow periods has been their literary value, as against the traditional philological approach. Each text is preceded by brief, but cogent, introductory notes, in English, dealing with the historical, geographical, and genealogical data. Numerous footnotes provide the necessary grammatical and syntactical explanations. The Appendix contains a systematic glossary of obsolete and archaic words. The aims of the editor, set forth in the introduction, have been admirably fulfilled. The *Anthology* fills a serious gap and will be of great help to Russian and non-Russian students of old Russian culture.

BROWN, GLENORA W. and BROWN, DEMING B. *A Guide to Soviet Russian Translations of American Literature.* New York, King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1954. 243 pp. \$5.00.

This is a useful checklist of American literature in Russian translations, 1917-1947, with an interesting introduction by one of the authors, "Soviet Taste in American Literature." From this study it appears

that the American authors most widely published in Russian translations, mostly during the N.E.P., were the following: Jack London, Mark Twain, Upton Sinclair, O. Henry, James Oliver Curwood, Joel C. Harris, David Freedman, Theodore Dreiser, John Steinbeck, James F. Cooper, Erskine Caldwell, Sinclair Lewis, Ernest Hemingway—to mention a few in order of their popularity. Since 1947, however, those authors who once enjoyed great popularity (Hemingway, Caldwell and Steinbeck, for example) have been denounced and discarded. "The Soviet reader of today," Mr. Brown states in his Introduction, "probably thinks of American literature in terms of the works of Jack London and O. Henry, a small number of nineteenth-century classics, and a handful of officially approved left-wing contemporaries. If he is fortunate, he may occasionally be able to find an old and worn copy of *A Farewell to Arms* or *Elmer Gantry*. But if his memory goes back three decades, he probably recalls wistfully the wealth of American literature that was once available to him."

DIXON, AUBREY C. and HEILBRUNN, OTTO. *Communist Guerilla Warfare.* New York, Praeger, 1954. 229 pp. \$4.50.

Based on captured German documents, the testimony of Wehrmacht officers, and numerous reports from German and Soviet sources, this study deals with the efforts of the Germans to master the guerilla menace in World War II. It also describes the plan of guerilla campaign as formulated by Mao Tse-tung in 1937. The authors urge

that a training manual on guerilla warfare should be prepared for the armies of the free nations, for, they state, "in any future war, enemy guerillas will act as auxiliaries to their regular army, as they did in the Russian campaign, with specific tactics and techniques peculiar to a supporting force 'on the other side of the hill.'"

It is a timely book and should be of interest to students of military affairs and all those concerned with the defense of the free world.

FISHER, HAROLD H. *The Communist Revolution: An Outline of Strategy and Tactics*. Stanford, California, Hoover Institute Studies, Stanford University Press, 1955. 89 pp. \$1.00.

The author, Chairman of the Hoover Institute and Professor of History at Stanford University, summarizes in this book "some of the knowledge already available on the character, history, strengths and weaknesses of the world Communist movement." Beginning with an exposition of Marx's theories and their effect upon the world, Professor Fisher outlines Lenin's interpretation and "application" of these theories to Russian conditions. Following an exposé of the Bolshevik seizure of power, the author systematically analyzes the strategy and tactics of the proletarian dictatorship under Lenin and Stalin. A section of the book deals with the Communist revolution in Asia. The last two chapters deal with the cold war and U. S. policy. Professor Fisher is an advocate of George Kennan's containment policy. His conclusion is that "involuntary" coexistence may go on indefinitely, until the time when the Com-

munists conclude that their policies cost more than they are worth.

S. L. Frank, 1877-1950 [in Russian]. Published by Tatiana Frank. Munich, Germany, 1954. 193 pp.

Russian philosophical and religious thought is much the richer by S. L. Frank's contributions to it. This collection of articles, edited by Rev. V. Zenkovsky, is a tribute, by a group of contemporaries, to the personality and the thought of this remarkable man. It contains biographical material, analyses of his philosophical works and a complete bibliography of his books and articles.

Geography of the Northlands. Ed. by George H. T. Kimball and Dorothy Good. New York, American Geographical Society and John Wiley and Sons; London, Chapman and Hall, 1955. 534 pp. \$10.50.

Fourteen experts survey the physical conditions, economic resources and cultures of the arctic and sub-arctic regions. Six chapters, by Bogdan Zaborski, deal with the U.S.S.R.: "North European part"; "Western Siberia"; "Central Siberia"; "Eastern Siberia"; "Kamchatka, the Komandorskiye Islands, and the Kuriles"; "Arctic Archipelagoes."

HOLZLE, ERWIN. *Russland und Amerika. Aufbruch und Begegnung zweier Weltmächte*. München, Oldenbourg, 1953. 308 pp. DM. 19.80.

This is a scholarly survey of Russian-American relations from their beginnings in the eighteenth

century to about 1870. The sources are largely American and the emphasis is primarily on diplomatic and commercial relations, although a few chapters are devoted to the impact of American democratic ideas upon Russian nineteenth-century radicals.

JAKOBSON, ROMAN. *Ivan Fedorov's Primer of 1574*. Facsimile Edition with Commentary by Roman Jakobson and Appendix by William A. Jackson. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard College Library, 1955. 81 pp.

In his "Introductory Remarks," Professor Roman Jakobson describes the content, sources, the place of the Lvov Manual among other Church Slavonic Primers, and its historical significance. In the Appendix, Professor W. A. Jackson discusses the Manual's special bibliographical features and relationships. The second part of this pamphlet consists of facsimile reproductions of all pages of the Primer.

MAJSTRENKO, IWAN. *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism*. New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954. 326 pp. \$4.50.

"Borot'bism" is the name of a Ukrainian Soviet party, based largely on the peasantry, which allied itself with the Bolsheviks and which was eventually liquidated by Moscow. The name is derived from their newspaper, *Borot'ba*, Struggle. As a political program it is, in a sense, a forerunner of Titoism, being probably the earliest example of national Communism. The author is one of the few surviving

adherents of this group. He traces the history of Borot'bism down to the purges of 1933. His study is written with considerable detachment and is based partly on personal reminiscences and partly on research.

MANNING, CLARENCE A. *Russian Influence on Early America*. New York, Library Publishers, 1953. 216 pp. \$3.75.

One of the principal aims of this book appears to be to demonstrate that "Communist idealism, Soviet patriotism, and Great Russian chauvinism and xenophobia" are one and the same thing. To prove this the author has chosen the history of Alaska. The largest part of the book re-tells the long-familiar story of the Russian-American Company. Russian expansion, according to Manning, "was a curiously complex process, for it was neither exclusively commercial nor military and naval." The chapter on the Monroe Doctrine is threadbare. It is unfortunate that the author has apparently ignored the correspondence between Alexander I and Thomas Jefferson. The study leans heavily on Okun's *Russian-American Company*.

PASSAGE, CHARLES E. *Dostoevski the Adapter. A Study in Dostoevski's Use of the Tales of Hoffmann*. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. 203 pp. Cloth, \$4.50; paper, \$3.50.

In a general way it has been known for a long time that the German romantic writer, Hoffmann, has had an influence on a number of Russian nineteenth-century writers, notably Gogol and Dostoevsky. The author of this study, who is a

holder of a Harvard Ph.D. degree in Comparative Literature, demonstrates in this volume that Dostoevsky's narrative art evolved by a conscious adaptation of Hoffmann's *Tales*. In the Preface, the author makes the following statement describing the book's content: "The investigation reveals that Dostoevsky's works in the years 1845-49 were neither effortless nor capricious, nor so 'realistic' as has been thought, nor so radically new, nor so uniquely Russian, nor so independent as general opinion has held. In stating these things, no iota of detraction from Dostoevsky's greatness is intended. The stature of his genius is rather enhanced by a better understanding of its operations." This is an important study and should be of interest to students of Russian and comparative literatures.

RESHETAR, JOHN S., JR. *Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior*. Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1955. 69 pp. \$0.95.

This pamphlet, prepared by Dr. John Reshetar, Jr., of Princeton University, attempts to analyze and evaluate the different current approaches to the study of the Soviet Union—historical, ideological, cultural and sociological. Also, it aims "to render explicit many of the assumptions, concepts, and theories employed by those scholars who have written about Soviet Russia." Chapter 4 is devoted to

the problem of estimating Soviet capabilities (economical and military) and the difficulties in reaching a balanced estimate of Soviet power. Appended is a selective bibliography of works in English on the Soviet Union. Useful in many respects, one weakness of this outline is that the author fails to distinguish sharply enough between the more and the less promising approaches to the study of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Theaters, 1917-1941. Edited by Martha Bradshaw. New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954. 371 pp. \$4.00.

This work is a collection of five specialized articles written by Soviet theater people in exile. Perhaps the most interesting is Gabriel Ramensky's "The Theater in Soviet Concentration Camps." The most scholarly one is Peter Yershov's "Training Actors for the Moldavian and Bulgarian Theaters, 1934-1938." The other studies are Serge Orlovsky's "Moscow Theaters, 1917-1941," Boris Volkov's "The Red Army Central Theater in Moscow," and Yosip Hirniak's "Birth and Death of the Modern Ukrainian Theater."

The documentation is not always adequate, although the effort to make it so has obviously been made. The articles are all variants of the same theme: early promise and subsequent disillusionment. The book should appeal most to specialists on the Soviet theater.

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